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The Virtue in Bankruptcy
Matthew Bruckner
In response to a gap in the corporate bankruptcy literature, this
Article offers a new positive theory of corporate bankruptcy law based
on virtue ethics. The dominant theory of corporate bankruptcy law—the
creditors’ bargain model—is necessarily incomplete because it does not
account for bankruptcy courts’ equitable and discretionary powers, or
for bankruptcy courts’ need to consider decision-making criteria other
than economic efficiency. By contrast, virtue ethics offers insights
about these features of corporate bankruptcy law for at least three
reasons. First, bankruptcy courts appear to give content to bankruptcy
laws by using virtue ethical principles. Second, virtue ethics’ decisionmaking process—practical wisdom—provides insights into how
bankruptcy judges balance concerns about efficiency, justice, and
fairness when reaching decisions. This is particularly true when the
bankruptcy court’s equitable jurisdiction or discretionary powers are
implicated. Third, virtue ethics’ symbiotic consideration of means and
ends parallels the process bankruptcy judges are called on to use when
exercising their discretionary or equitable powers under numerous
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
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INTRODUCTION
“From its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has been to
foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its
borders.”1
Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. 2 Congress has empowered

1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970).
2. See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (noting bankruptcy courts are courts of
equity); see also Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 389 (1993)
(noting that bankruptcy courts are “necessarily entrusted with broad equitable powers”); In re
SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that bankruptcy courts have the
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the bankruptcy courts to modify the contractual relationships between
debtors and creditors, and to craft flexible remedies designed to ensure
“complete justice” is done.3 To provide complete justice for parties to a
bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy judge must consider principles such as
equity, honesty, fairness, and justice.4 These principles must be
considered for at least two reasons. First, the bankruptcy laws often
specifically direct the bankruptcy courts to consider such principles.5
Second, as courts of equity, bankruptcy courts are obligated to “prevent
injustice or unfairness in the administration of bankruptcy estates.”6 As
a result, bankruptcy judges regularly “eschew[] mechanical rules” to
ensure that the bankruptcy process achieves fair and just results. 7
The Bankruptcy Code8 also commits a substantial number of
“equitable authority to ensure ‘that substance will not give way to form, that technical
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done’” (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 305 (1939))). But see Hon. Alan M. Ahart, A Stern Reminder that the Bankruptcy
Court is not a Court of Equity, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 200 (2012) (concluding that a
bankruptcy court is not one of equity).
3. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 340 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that bankruptcy
courts have broad authority to act to prevent injustice); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 567 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that
Congress’ regulation did not alter bankruptcy courts’ fundamental nature).
4. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d at 340 (noting that because bankruptcy courts are
courts of equity, they must invoke equitable principles like fairness and justice); see also
Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 373 (2007) (denying conversion of a Chapter 7
proceeding to a Chapter 13 proceeding in spite of language in the Bankruptcy Code suggesting
that conversion was mandatory because of dishonesty by the debtor).
5. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012) (providing that prepetition security agreements
cover related postpetition property unless “the equities of the case” require otherwise); id. §§
1113(b)(1)(A), 1114(g)(3) (allowing the rejection or modification of collective bargaining
agreements and retirements savings plans, respectively, only if “all creditors, the debtor and all of
the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably”); id. § 1129(b) (allowing cramdown unless
the plan discriminates unfairly, or if it is not “fair and equitable”); see also Allied Signal
Recovery Trust v. Allied Signal, Inc., 298 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2002) (“‘[E]quitable’ is defined
as ‘signal[ing] that which is reasonable, fair, or appropriate.’” (quoting Things Remembered, Inc.
v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 133 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))); In re Patio & Porch Sys., Inc.,
194 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (“This ‘equities of the case’ provision is intended to
prevent secured creditors from receiving windfalls and to allow bankruptcy courts broad
discretion in balancing the interests of secured creditors against the general policy of the
Bankruptcy Code, which favors giving debtors a ‘fresh start.’”); In re Crouch, 51 B.R. 331, 332
(Bankr. D. Or. 1985) (discussing § 552(b)’s “equities of the case” rule).
6. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d at 340 (citing Pepper, 308 U.S. 295 at 305). In a
number of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy judges are specifically directed to
consider principles such as justice, fairness, honesty, and equity in rendering decisions. See, e.g.,
11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (providing that collective bargaining agreements can only be rejected if
“the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection”); see also id. § 1114(g)(3) (stating that
certain pension plans are only subject to modification if “all of the affected parties are treated
fairly and equitably, and is clearly favored by the balance of the equities”).
7. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
8. This Article uses the terms “Bankruptcy Code” and “Code” to refer to the Bankruptcy
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decisions to the discretion of the bankruptcy judge.9 For example, the
Bankruptcy Code empowers bankruptcy judges to confirm a plan of
reorganization, provided that the plan is feasible.10 However, the Code
does not define feasibility, nor does it provide any substantive guidance
as to how feasibility should be determined.11 Instead, the Code
empowers bankruptcy courts to use their discretion to determine the
relevant considerations in a particular case and then to apply those
factors to the facts of that case.12

Reform Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. (2012)).
9. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 105; id. § 107(c)(1); id. § 303; id. § 324; id. § 349; id. § 350; id. §
362; id. § 363; id. § 365; id. § 502; id. § 503; id. § 1104; id. § 1112; id. § 1113; id. § 1114; id. §
1121; id. § 1129; see also In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[A]
bankruptcy judge must not be shackled with unnecessarily rigid rules when exercising the
undoubtedly broad administrative power granted him under the [Bankruptcy] Code.”). Precisely
how much discretion bankruptcy judges possess is hotly contested. See, e.g., Law v. Siegel (In re
Law), 435 Fed. Appx. 697, 698 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
“properly affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order granting the trustee’s surcharge motion because
the surcharge was calculated to compensate the estate for the actual monetary costs imposed by
the debtor’s misconduct and was warranted to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process”
(citing Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774, 786 (9th Cir. 2004)), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824
(2013); cf. Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy,
13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 153–54 (2005).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (stating that the court shall not confirm a plan unless it finds
that “[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for
further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless
such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan”); see also In re Geijsel, 480 B.R. 238,
256–57 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2012) (describing how feasibility is required for confirmation).
11. “Feasibility” is a shorthand reference to the requirements of § 1129(a)(11) of the United
States Code. See In re Geijsel, 480 B.R. at 256.
12. In response, bankruptcy courts have generally considered factors such as the debtor’s
proposed capital structure, the earning power of the business, economic conditions, the ability of
the debtor’s management, and the probability that existing management will remain in place. See
Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941); see also In re Nellson
Nutraceutical, Inc., No. 06-10072, 2007 WL 201134, at *27–28 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 18, 2007)
(citing Consolidated Rock Prods. with approval for the proposition that an estimate of earning
capacity must be based on all relevant facts); In re Geijsel, 480 B.R. at 257 (“Courts have
employed the following factors in determining whether a plan is feasible: the debtor’s capital
structure, the earning power of the business, economic conditions, the ability of debtor’s
management, the probability of continuation of management, and other related matter (citing In re
Mortg. Inv. Co. of El Paso, 111 B. R. 604, 611 n.8 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990))). However, the test
is a loose one that allows courts to weigh the various factors at their discretion, including
weighing any particular factor at zero. See Harbin v. IndyMac Bank FSB (In re Harbin), 486
F.2d 510, 521 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that bankruptcy courts may exercise equitable discretion);
see also In re Geijsel, 480 B.R. at 257 (noting that bankruptcy courts may ignore various factors
(citing In re Landing Assocs., Ltd. 157 B.R. 791, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993))); NATHALIE
MARTIN & OCEAN TAMA, INSIDE BANKRUPTCY LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 178 (2008)
(“[T]he feasibility test is applied by the courts on a case-by-case basis within the very broad
discretion of the bankruptcy court.”); Robert A. Sauro, Chapter 11 Confirmation: Increasing
Judicial Discretion, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 191, 206 (1987) (noting that courts consider many factors
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Existing bankruptcy scholarship has addressed neither the role of
bankruptcy courts as courts of equity nor their substantial discretionary
powers.13 Instead, scholars have largely focused on debating the
appropriate goals for our bankruptcy laws.14 Some scholars have
when determining feasibility).
13. But see KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM 216 (1999) (criticizing textualist interpretations of the Code and claiming that judges
must be able to look to policies that lay behind the text in order to reach correct decisions).
14. Compare Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Financial and Political
Theories] (arguing that the “common pool” justification for corporate bankruptcy—which asserts
that bankruptcy “provides for an orderly disposition of claims against a debtor firm,” thereby
preserving “intact the firm’s ‘common pool’”—is unsatisfactory), Philippe Aghion et al.,
Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 851–52 (1994) [hereinafter Aghion,
Improving Bankruptcy] (arguing that “a good bankruptcy procedure” should “try to achieve an ex
post efficient outcome,” “give managers the right ex ante incentives to avoid bankruptcy,”
“preserve absolute priority,” and “put ultimate decisionmaking power in the hands of the
claimants”), Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
523, 532–33 (1992) [hereinafter Aghion, Economics of Bankruptcy Reform] (arguing that “a good
bankruptcy procedure is one that . . . maximizes the ex post value of the firm . . . [and] preserves
the (ex ante) bonding role of debt by penalizing management adequately in bankruptcy states
(emphasis omitted)), Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 97 (1984) (rejecting the notion “that a
bankruptcy proceeding provides . . . an essentially unlimited opportunity to do what appears at the
moment to be good, just, or fair,” and arguing that bankruptcy serves “a unique, but limited,
function in our society”), Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for
Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1089 (1992) (arguing that “Chapter 11 should be repealed and
replaced”), Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 871–72 (1982) (arguing that bankruptcy law does not faithfully
mirror the creditors’ bargain model), and Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 100 (1992) (discussing the “selections
that should be on a congressionally enacted [bankruptcy] menu”), with Susan Block-Lieb, The
Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 519 (2001) (asserting that
both “[c]ommentators applying an economic analysis” of bankruptcy law and their critics “could
learn from the other”), Linda J. Rusch, Bankruptcy Reorganization Jurisprudence: Matters of
Belief, Faith, and Hope—Stepping into the Fourth Dimension, 55 MONT. L. REV. 9, 17–22 (1994)
(describing the two competing paradigms of bankruptcy reorganization: the creditors’ bargain and
loss allocation), Charles J. Tabb, Of Contractarians and Bankruptcy Reform: A Skeptical View,
12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 259, 259–60 (2004) (“[A] non-waiveable bankruptcy system, with
a supervised bankruptcy process, and a non-waiveable discharge right, are not only important, but
necessary and essential.”), Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 778
(1987) [hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policy] (contrasting her own views of bankruptcy with
those of Professor Douglas Baird), Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect
World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 338–86 [hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking]
(discussing “the various and competing goals that underlie the bankruptcy system”), and
Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 467 (1992)
[hereinafter Warren, Untenable Case] (arguing that while bankruptcy does function “to preserve
value in faltering businesses and to enhance the return to all those who have an interest in the
business” as argued by Bradley and Rosenzweig, “it also serves to redistribute value”); see also
Stephen J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839, 850 n.47 (2005); Irit
Haviv-Segal, Bankruptcy Law and Inefficient Entitlements 4–12 (2004) (unpublished
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advanced a view of bankruptcy based on the so-called creditors’ bargain
model.15 They suggest that bankruptcy laws should only seek to
accomplish two things: (i) maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate
and (ii) respect ex ante contractual entitlements to the greatest extent
possible.16 Other scholars have taken a wider view and suggest that
bankruptcy laws are appropriately focused on reorganizing struggling
businesses, preserving jobs, protecting taxing authorities, redistributing
assets, enhancing community stability, and other similar aims.17
Missing from the debate, however, has been an attempt to develop a
positive theory of bankruptcy law that adequately explains the most
salient features of our current bankruptcy system, including the
equitable and discretionary powers of bankruptcy courts, and Congress’
decision to privilege decision-making criteria other than economic
efficiency.18

manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=612981 (noting that
the “main conflict between different approaches of bankruptcy law is the familiar one between
the economic and social approaches,” and discussing these approaches).
15. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 17 (1986)
(noting that “[b]ankruptcy provides a way to override the creditors’ pursuit of their own remedies
and to make them work together”); cf. Richard V. Butler & Scott M. Gilpatric, A Re-Examination
of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269, 270–71 (1994);
Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 759, 764–65 (2011) (assuming that the creditors’ bargain model is an appropriate
framework). But see Thomas H. Jackson & Robert Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 202 (1989) (retreating
from an earlier normative position and concluding that “a single-minded focus on preserving the
value of prebankruptcy entitlements is not necessarily the optimal means of mirroring a
hypothetical ex ante bargain among the creditors”).
16. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 24 (“Bankruptcy law is best approached by separating . . .
the question of how the process can maximize the value of a given pool of assets and the question
of how the law should allocate entitlements.”); see also Butler & Gilpatric, supra note 15, at 270–
71 (describing that the two goals of bankruptcy are maximizing values and dealing with
allocating entitlements); Casey, supra note 15, at 766 (noting that the “only goal of bankruptcy
law is to maximize the value of the firm in bankruptcy”); Jackson & Scott, supra note 15, at 170.
17. See Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 14, at 776, 788 (asserting that bankruptcy
serves “‘the public interest’ beyond the interests of the disputing parties” in recognition “of the
larger implications of a debtor’s widespread default and the consequences of permitting a few
creditors to force a business to close”); see also Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44
S.C. L. REV. 791, 804 (noting that the greater good of the community has always been relevant to
bankruptcy policy); Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 14, at 355 (recognizing the
Code gives protection to persons with no formal legal rights); Warren, Untenable Case, supra
note 14, at 467 (stating that bankruptcy serves to redistribute value); Haviv-Segal, supra note 14,
at 11 (“[A]dvocates of the social approaches stress the numerous aims and values that form the
basis of bankruptcy law.”).
18. Although they do not address themselves to these points, some scholars have offered
normative theories of bankruptcy from outside the dominant perspective. See, e.g., GROSS, supra
note 13 (justifying the “fresh start” for individual and business debtors, explaining why some
creditors are more deserving of payment than others, and justifying the role of community in the
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This Article seeks to fill the gap in the corporate bankruptcy literature
by offering a new, positive theory of bankruptcy law based on virtue
ethics.19 Virtue ethics is one of the three major schools of moral
philosophy,20 and offers a normative account of how citizens should
live their lives so that they might achieve eudaimonia (human
flourishing).21 Eudaimonia is the ultimate good: the goal that
individuals (and the law)22 should work to achieve.23 Achieving the
ultimate good is only possible if individuals act virtuously.24 Virtuous
bankruptcy process); Donald Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of
Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541 (1993) [hereinafter Korobkin, Normative Foundations]
(offering a “bankruptcy choice model”); Donald Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A
Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991) [hereinafter Korobkin,
Rehabilitating Values] (offering a “values-based account”); Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team
Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741 (2004) [hereinafter
LoPucki, Team Production Theory] (offering a team production account); Ronald Mann,
Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money is it Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 993 (1995) (proposing a theoretical justification for the distributive aspects of the
bankruptcy system).
19. See infra Part I (discussing existing bankruptcy theory and the need for an alternative).
For the purposes of this project, all references to virtue ethics should be considered as references
to the “broad range of theories of practical philosophy that . . . place high priority on virtue and
on happiness.” Eric R. Claeys, Response: Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 889, 891 (2008). Although many contemporary virtue theorists work within
the “neo-Aristotelian” framework (or the closely related neo-Thomistic tradition), there are
exceptions. This Article draws heavily from Aristotelian understandings of virtue ethics, but also
from other sources, particularly Rosalind Hursthouse and Alasdair MacIntyre. See ROSALIND
HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999) [hereinafter HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS];
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1981).
20. Deontology and consequentialism being the other two traditions. See Lee J. Strang,
Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue’s Home in Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1997, 2017 (2012) (recognizing that the “two other competing ethical traditions are deontology
and consequentialism”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 118 (describing Arisotelianism
as “philosophically the most powerful of pre-modern modes of moral thought”).
21. Eudaimonia means something akin to ultimate happiness, human flourishing, or the
qualities necessary to lead a good life. See, e.g., Peter Koller, Law, Morality, and Virtue, in
WORKING VIRTUE: VIRTUE ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS 191, 192 (Rebecca
L. Walker & Philip L. Ivanhoe eds., 2007) (defining eudaimonia as “a human life that is
intrinsically good from the individual’s viewpoint and the general perspective as well”); see also
MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 147–48 (noting the link between virtue and happiness); ROBERT
C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN BUSINESS 105
(1992) (describing eudaimonia as “‘flourishing or doing well’” (citations omitted)).
22. See Chapin F. Cimino, Virtue and Contract Law, 88 OR. L. REV. 703, 715 (2009)
[hereinafter Cimino, Virtue and Contract] (noting Aristotle’s belief in government’s obligation to
train its citizens to be virtuous).
23. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, reprinted in ARISTOTLE: SELECTIONS 347, 350
(Terence Irwin & Gail Fine trans., 1995) (noting that happiness “is the highest of all the goods
pursued”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 147–48 (noting the link between virtue and
happiness); SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 106 (noting that happiness is the ultimate end to be
pursued).
24. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 371–72 (“It should be said, then, that every virtue
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action takes practice, and only by repeated, conscious efforts to
internalize virtuous behavior is eudaimonia achievable.25
Virtue jurisprudence differs from consequentialist theories of law,
such as the creditors’ bargain model, because it does not focus on
achieving a single type of outcome in all cases, such as the most
efficient outcome.26 And, although it aims to promote the end of human
flourishing, virtue jurisprudence is not outcome-centered in the same
sense as the creditors’ bargain model.27 Eudaimonia—the outcome
virtue ethics seeks to promote—is both an internal and a multi-variable
concept.28 As such, promoting the ability of each person to achieve
eudaimonia may involve trade-offs between and among individuals,
trade-offs that may be irreducible to a single, decision-making criteria,
such as efficiency.29
Virtue ethics promises to offer insight into our bankruptcy laws for at
least three reasons. First, virtue jurisprudence and bankruptcy law are
both moored on similar values and principles.30 Bankruptcy law, like
causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their functions well . . . .”); see also
Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 713 (“At its broadest level, Aristotelian virtue
causes human beings to be happy and function well.”).
25. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 4–5 (1992) (noting that acting virtuously must be
practiced in order to be fully developed).
26. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 367 (“[Q]uestions about actions and expediency, like
questions about health, have no fixed and invariable answers.”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note
19, at 149; Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 715 (noting that virtue jurisprudence
does not focus on a single type of outcome).
27. An outcome-centered theory must offer a theory for what should count as the good, right,
just, or legally valid decision. Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence, A Virtue-Centered
Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 184 (2003) [hereinafter Solum, Theory of
Judging]. For example, law and economics typically offers the maximization of preference
satisfaction as the preferred outcome for decisions. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 15, at 222;
Aghion, Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 14, at 543 (noting that shareholders hold
value maximization as a “common objective”). Virtue ethics focuses on achieving human
flourishing, which may require different outcomes in difference cases. But see MACINTYRE,
supra note 19, at 185 (noting Benjamin Franklin’s emphasis on a utilitarian variety of virtue
ethics).
28. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 751 (2009) (arguing that human flourishing is a multivariable concept and
that the multiple relevant components of human flourishing are incommensurable); see also
MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 184 (noting the incommensurability of “internal goods and
external goods”).
29. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 198–99 (“[T]he notion of summing goods . . . in terms
of one single formula or conception of utility . . . makes no sense.”).
30. Professor Lawrence B. Solum has coined the phrase “virtue jurisprudence” to refer to “a
normative and explanatory theory of law that utilises [sic] the resources of virtue epistemology,
virtue ethics, and virtue politics to answer the central questions of legal theory.” Solum, Theory
of Judging, supra note 27, at 178; see also Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 707
(noting that some in the legal academy have coined the phrase “virtue jurisprudence”). This
Article will use Professor Solum’s phrase to refer to virtue ethics as applied to legal problems.
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most law, was shaped by values and principles such as fairness, justice,
equity, honesty, and loyalty that underlie common notions of morality.31
These concerns also lay at the heart of virtue jurisprudence. As such,
virtue jurisprudential concerns about fairness, justice, and equity are
often explicitly considered and cited by bankruptcy judges. 32 The
content of these often-cited principles appears to be derived from virtue
ethics.33 At a minimum, virtue ethics may offer insight into what
judges mean when they write that “justice” or “fairness” dictates a result
in a particular case.34 As such, understanding virtue jurisprudence helps
to explain bankruptcy law.
Second, virtue jurisprudence’s decision theory (practical wisdom)
provides useful insights into how bankruptcy judges decide cases.35
31. See In re Federated Dep’t Stores Inc., 44 F.3d 1310, 1320 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Despite our
holding today, we believe denying all compensation to Lehman Brothers would not be
equitable.”); In re Greystone Holdings, L.L.C., 305 B.R. 456, 463 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003)
(noting the demands of fairness and equity on its decision); In re Edwards, 228 B.R. 552, 562
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that bankruptcy courts have “ample latitude to strike a satisfactory
balance between the relevant factors of fairness, finality, integrity and maximization of assets”);
see also JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE
148–51 (1991) [hereinafter GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS] (discussing the origins of
unconscionability); Bailey Kuklin, “You Should Have Known Better,” 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 545,
576 (2000); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Foreword: Constitutions and
Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56–73 (2007);
Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475, 478
(2005).
32. See, e.g., Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477 (1968) (noting the Bankruptcy Code’s
“decisive, statutory objective: fairness to all persons having claims against an insolvent”); see
also In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 449 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting bankruptcy courts’
“equitable authority to ensure ‘that substance will not give way to form, that technical
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done’” (quoting Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939))); Onick v. Cardelucci (In re Cardelucci), 285 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir.
2002) (asserting that the interests of “‘fairness, equality, and predictability’” justified its holding
(internal citations omitted)); Matthew Nozemack, Note, Making Sense Out of Bankruptcy Courts’
Recharacterization of Claims: Why Not Use § 510(c) Equitable Subordination?, 56 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 689 (1999) (examining the authority of bankruptcy courts to subordinate claims on
equitable grounds).
33. Cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 192 (discussing the requirements of justice and
courage).
34. See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a
proferred reading of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 because of the
“unfair result” that would follow); see also In re Federated Dept. Stores Inc., 44 F.3d at 1320
(“[W]e are of the view that fairness and equity dictate allowing Lehamn Brothers to be
compensated . . . .”); In re Greystone, 305 B.R. at 463 (noting the demands of fairness and equity
on its decision); In re Edwards, 228 B.R. at 562 (noting that bankruptcy courts have “ample
latitude to strike a satisfactory balance between the relevant factors of fairness, finality, integrity
and maximization of assets”).
35. See HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 19, at 12 (discussing practical wisdom).
Practical wisdom has variously been referred to as prudence, practical reason, phronesis, and
situation-sense. See Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence, in VIRTUE
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Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that helps decision makers
make good decisions, even when several potentially competing virtues
apply to a particular situation and appear to call for disparate results.36
Bankruptcy judges often must decide how to balance uncertain,
indeterminate, or incommensurate37 values or policies in order to reach
the correct result in a particular case; virtue ethics may offer some
insights into how they do so. Practical wisdom offers insights that can
help explain how bankruptcy judges perform this balancing act because
the process of choosing among competing bankruptcy policies is similar
to the process of choosing among competing virtues.38
Finally, virtue jurisprudence calls for a decision maker to
simultaneously consider both the means and the ends of the law in a
“fully symbiotic way.”39
Virtue jurisprudence’s symbiotic
consideration of means and ends allows virtue ethics to offer insights
into the decision-making process of judges who are considering whether
to authorize discretionary relief.40 A virtue jurisprudential approach

JURISPRUDENCE 1, 52–53 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) (describing the
decision-making process of virtue ethics); Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, in VIRTUE
JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 88, 91 (noting the many names authors have given to the Aristotelian
notion of phronesis).
36. See Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 84 (2006) [hereinafter,
Solum, Natural Justice] (describing practical wisdom); see also HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS,
supra note 19, at 40 (noting that practical wisdom is required to interpret rules and determine
which rules are most appropriately applied).
37. A claim of incommensurability suggests that certain ends cannot be traded off for one
another, and thus denies that certain ends can be evaluated by a unitary metric—therefore, any
attempt to introduce such a metric would misdescribe the human experience. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 800 (1994)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Incommensurability]. For example, human beings need food, clothing, and
shelter to survive. At some minimum threshold, these are incommensurable needs. One cannot
trade all of one’s food for additional shelter and hope to survive. A person needs a minimum
amount of each in order to live. The creditors’ bargain model depends on an assumption of
commensurability. Otherwise, a single variable decision-making criteria, such as efficiency,
would be useless.
38. Aristotle appears to have believed that virtues were never in conflict and that a truly
virtuous person could reconcile the apparently (but not actually) conflicting demands of different
virtues. This has led some to suggest that Aristotle was a value monist and would deny the
existence of plural values, which appears to be a necessary pre-condition for a claim of
incommensurability.
See Ruth Elizabeth Chang, Value Pluralism, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 16139, 16139 (James Wright ed.,
2012) (noting that Aristotle was arguably a proponent of value monism). Neo-Aristotelian theory
is much more sympathetic to arguments that plural and potentially incommensurable values exist.
See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 168 (arguing that moral Aristotelianism is not “necessarily
committed to a strong thesis concerning the unity of virtues”). This Article draws on neoAristotelian theories on this issue.
39. Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 712.
40. See id. (asserting that “virtue theory may better account for contract’s dual dimensions”).
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requires decision makers to consider whether to authorize discretionary
relief to consider two questions: (i) what ends does the Bankruptcy
Code seek to achieve; and (ii) what is the best way to achieve those
ends.41 Virtue ethics’ dual focus better42 accounts for how bankruptcy
judges decide whether to grant discretionary relief because it parallels
the requirements of many sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Virtue
ethics, like the Code, calls on a bankruptcy judge to consider the
purpose of the relevant provision: both what it seeks to achieve and how
best to achieve that goal.43
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows. Part I
discusses the dominant model of bankruptcy theory—the creditors’
bargain. After providing a brief overview of this theory, this Part
focuses on one particular flaw of the creditors’ bargain: its focus on
efficiency poorly explains existing corporate bankruptcy doctrine. Part
I also explains why a new theory of corporate bankruptcy law would be
useful. Part II introduces virtue ethics and explains three key features of
virtue jurisprudence that allow it to provide an attractive descriptive
account of corporate bankruptcy law.44 Part III provides three specific
examples where virtue jurisprudence more accurately explains current
bankruptcy doctrine. A conclusion follows.
I. EXISTING BANKRUPTCY THEORY AND THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE
A. The Creditors’ Bargain Theory
The creditors’ bargain has been the dominant theory of bankruptcy
law for decades,45 and although several other normative theories of
41. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing virtue jurisprudence’s consideration of means and ends).
42. Virtue ethics offers a “better” approach than other theories because it calls for an analysis
more closely aligned with the text of the Code itself. See Paul R. Thagard, The Best Explanation:
Criteria for Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL. 76, 79 (1978) (stating that theories are comparable based
on their “consilience,” which is a measure of how much a particular theory explains—if an
alternative theory has greater consilience, it might fairly be said to be a better theory).
43. Cf. Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 737 (noting that “a court would . . .
inquir[e] into the parties’ goals for both the means and the ends of the contract” (emphasis in
original)).
44. Virtue jurisprudence may also offer an attractive normative account of bankruptcy law,
but the normative implications of virtue ethics are beyond the scope of this Article. I expect to
address the normative implications of virtue jurisprudence for bankruptcy law in a follow-up
article.
45. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. SYMES, STATUTORY PRIORITIES IN CORPORATE
INSOLVENCY LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF PREFERRED CREDITOR STATUS 70 (2008) (noting the
dominance of the creditors’ bargain theory); Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics
of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1454 (2012) (same); Rolef J. de Weijs, Too Big to Fail
as a Game of Chicken with the State: What Insolvency Law Theory has to say about TBTF and
Vice Versa 3 (Amsterdam Law School, Research Paper No. 2012-90, 2012), available at
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bankruptcy law exist,46 none have had as profound an impact as that
model. The creditors’ bargain model is a “contractarian” approach to
bankruptcy law derived from early law and economics theory. 47
Originally proposed by Thomas Jackson, the creditors’ bargain model
claims that bankruptcy should mirror the hypothetical agreement
creditors would be expected to form among themselves if they were
able to negotiate from a pre-bankruptcy position.48 As originally stated,
the creditors’ bargain model tells us that the optimal bankruptcy system
should have only two aims: (i) respect nonbankruptcy contractual rights,
such as state law priority schemes; and (ii) maximize the expected value
of the assets of the bankruptcy estate.49
The creditors’ bargain model makes a number of assumptions
common to classical law and economics, including that actors are
entirely rational welfare maximizers, and that the costs and benefits of
any action can be compared along a single, scalar metric.50 The
creditors’ bargain model also assumes that parties51 would not strike a

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2145861 (same).
46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that some scholars have taken a wider
view of bankruptcy law); see also Donald Korobkin, The Role of Normative Theory in
Bankruptcy Debates, 82 IOWA L. REV. 75, 78–79 [hereinafter Korobkin, Normative Theory]
(noting that while many traditionalists “maintain that bankruptcy law should pursue the full range
of purposes that it currently does . . . they also seem to dismiss the use of normative theory to
support this view”); Levitin, supra note 45, at 1452.
47. See LoPucki, Team Production Theory, supra note 18, at 744 (discussing this point); see
also Levitin, supra note 45, at 1405 (same).
48. Jackson, supra note 14, at 860. But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditors’
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1896 (1994) (claiming that the available data suggest that “a
substantial portion of all unsecured creditors do not consent to their status in any meaningful
sense.”); Nathalie Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside
Looking In, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429, 485 (1998) (noting that “many creditors—including utilities,
taxing authorities, tort claimants, and environmental claimants had no intention of ever lending
money to the debtor”).
49. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
50. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 18–19 (discussing two bankruptcy assumptions—(1)
“insolvency occurs without warning” and (2) “bankruptcy proceedings take no time”—and, while
acknowledging that these two assumptions are “somewhat unrealistic,” asserting that imposing
these assumptions “clarifies several key features of bankruptcy law”); see also SOLOMON, supra
note 21, at 220 (discussing the concept of “[h]omo economicus who has no attachments or affects
other than crude self-interest and the ability to calculate how to satisfy that interest vis-à-vis other
people”); supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that the creditors’ bargain model is based
on an assumption of incommensurability).
51. Professor Jackson expects that debtors would negotiate with their shareholders and
creditors, but would exclude non-creditor employees, local communities, taxing authorities and
other similar interests. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 222; see also Martin, supra note 48, at 439
(asserting that Chapter 11’s rehabilitative goals “run not merely to the reorganizing company, its
creditors, and shareholders, but also to third party interests”). But see SOLOMON, supra note 21,
at 231.
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hypothetical bargain unless it was in their interests to do so.52 In other
words, bargains are only struck when they are efficient and maximize
value.53 These assumptions lead creditors’ bargain theorists to suggest
that considering non-creditor interests or distributing estate assets other
than in accordance with non-bankruptcy law is per se improper.54 For
example, when a debtor is deciding whether to continue its business as a
going concern or liquidate, its only considerations should be to
maximize returns to creditors (even at the expense of non-creditors) and
to ensure that non-bankruptcy rights are respected.55 Under the
creditors’ bargain theory, debtors should consider only the best interests
of its creditors, and not whether reorganization or liquidation would be
in the interests of employees, taxing authorities, or the local community,
among others.56
B. Flaws with the Creditors’ Bargain Theory
The creditors’ bargain theory has been heavily criticized for its
assumptions, methodology, and the ends it pursues.57 The most cogent
52. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 59 n.80 (“[I]t is unlikely that secured creditors would
agree to the bargain unless they received some of the gains resulting from the bargain.”).
53. This assumption has recently been called into question by a number of scholars. See, e.g.,
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648 (2010); Richard
A. Both, The New Shareholder and the Current Financial Crisis: Things Happen, 55 VILL. L.
REV. 57, 68 (2010); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1987, 1988–90, 2016 (2002); Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How
Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99 GEO. L.J. 1615 (2011) (asserting that creditors’ behavior
is influenced by financial regulation and regulatory policy).
54. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 214–15; see also LoPucki, Team Production Theory, supra
note 18, at 749 (noting that “[a]ny consideration of non-creditor interests . . . would be
inefficient” according to the creditors’ bargain theory). But see Wei Zhang, The Paradoxes of
Secured Lending: Is there a Less Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy
42 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1986908 (arguing that efficiency—at least in the context of secured lending—“goes
hand in hand with its distributional effects”).
55. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 24 (arguing that incorporating the policy of preserving
jobs into a bankruptcy statute “would be to mix apples and oranges”); see also LoPucki, Team
Production Theory, supra note 18, at 748–49 (noting that the creditors’ bargain theory is only
concerned with creditor interests).
56. It is unclear how the creditors’ bargain theory would account for assertions that creditor
behavior is not always value maximizing. If creditors’ bargain theorists would acknowledge that
creditors may properly pursue individually (but not collectively) wealth maximizing strategies,
see, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 53, at 651, they might have to reconsider whether
bankruptcy courts should protect non-creditor interests. Cf. Martin, supra note 48, at 429–30
(discussing non-creditor interests).
57. See, e.g., Jane Baron & Jeff Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431, 449 (1996) (“To assume, as
economists do, the appropriateness of economic analysis is to evade what is actually the prior and
deeper ethical question.”); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract
Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 715–16 (1980) (challenging certain empirical assumptions
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criticisms are that the creditors’ bargain model: (i) makes assumptions
that are too crude to yield accurate predictions about bankruptcy law;58
(ii) fails to acknowledge that sophisticated creditors have impliedly
consented to the current bankruptcy regime;59 and (iii) is a flawed
normative theory.60 Space constraints prevent a thorough discussion of
the theory’s many flaws, and this Article will focus on only one: the
disjunction between the theory’s singular focus on economic efficiency
and Chapter 11’s focus on other norms. However, even if the creditors’
bargain model were a fault-free normative account of bankruptcy law,
an alternative approach would still be useful because the creditors’
bargain fails to account for several key features of bankruptcy law.
A gap exists in the corporate bankruptcy literature because existing
theories, including the creditors’ bargain model, cannot and do not
accurately describe how Chapter 11 actually works.61 Economic
analysis tends to assume that the parties’ intent can be uncovered by
applying an efficiency norm, but for many corporate debtors and their
creditors (including non-contractual creditors) there are other norms at
work that may be more important to understanding the parties’ intent.62
relied on by the creditors’ bargain theorists); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 428 (1981); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1994) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations] (asserting that law and
economics assumptions are “too crude, so oversimple that they fail to single out those aspects of
the world that are most salient for predictive purposes.”); Eduardo M. Penalver, Land Virtues, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 821, 823 n.5 (2009) (noting that the “literature critiquing law and economics is
vast and rich” and citing “a few prominent examples,” including Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 521 (1980) (critiquing wealth
maximization as an efficiency criteria)); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The
Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 614 (2009)
[hereinafter Warren & Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11] (criticizing a creditors’ bargain
study for lack of proper explanation of methodology and other missing data).
58. See e.g., Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 114–16; Woo, supra note 53, at
1617; see also Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 794 (“[W]ith the assumption of a
unitary kind of valuation, we will sometimes offer inadequate predictions . . . .”).
59. See LoPucki, Team Production Theory, supra note 18, at 756–57 (2004) (suggesting that
sophisticated creditors who do not segregate their assets into bankruptcy-remote entities have
implicitly opted-in to the current bankruptcy system); cf. Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey,
No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
5 (2013) (same).
60. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 787–88
(1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning].
61. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, Methodological Realities, and the
Paradigm Dominance Game, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1308 (1994) [hereinafter LoPucki,
Reorganization Realities] (“Economists who work on bankruptcy tend to slip off into the world of
perfect markets and zero transaction costs . . . .”).
62. Multiple interests are typically at work. Even when one of those rationales is efficiency, a
theory that focuses exclusively on efficiency can be problematic. See, e.g., In re Cardelucci, 285
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The creditors’ bargain fails to account for behavior that is guided by
forces other than efficiency, even though corporate bankruptcy law is
clearly guided by other social norms and moral intuitions.63 Even if the
creditors’ bargain model were capable of accurately predicting the
behavior of insolvent or bankrupt companies, if the model
misunderstands the underlying motivations of actors, it may offer
seriously flawed policy prescriptions.64
The Bankruptcy Code specifically directs courts to consider nonefficiency rationales,65 but the creditors’ bargain model’s relentless
focus on efficiency blinds it to these directions. 66 Bankruptcy law
appears to be grounded in the same principles of fairness and justice
that undergird other areas of law and, like other areas of law, expects
that individuals will act reasonably, diligently, and carefully. 67
Bankruptcy law is exceptionally concerned with these values. Both as a
matter of statutory command, and as a result of bankruptcy courts’ role
as courts of equity, bankruptcy judges have a greater obligation than
most judges to ensure that “substantial justice” is done.68
The creditors’ bargain model cannot adequately explain bankruptcy
F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “two interests, fairness among creditors and
administrative efficiency,” are often both relevant to bankruptcy cases); see also SOLOMON,
supra note 21, at 127 (noting that even corporations consider virtues other than efficiency to be
relevant); Woo, supra note 53, at 1617–18 (arguing that bank regulation can explain decisions to
pursue liquidation even when reorganization would be value maximizing).
63. See David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 577, 613–14 (1989); see also Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 18, at 757–61
(discussing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 97 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), and concluding that
the case “displays the bankruptcy process as rich, complex, and evolutionary, allowing expression
and recognition of diverse human values”); Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 122 (1979) (“Wealth is an important element in most people’s
preferences . . . but it is not the sum total of those preferences.”); Sunstein, Incommensurability,
supra note 37, at 794; Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating
Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (2008).
64. See Penalver, supra note 57, at 841 (noting that the “potential for misunderstanding is
independently significant because it can result in seriously flawed policy prescriptions”); see also
Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 18, at 762 (arguing that, at best, the economic
account of bankruptcy law “offers an undermining explanation of a bankruptcy system that
recognizes noneconomic outcomes,” and, at worst, “does not explain ‘bankruptcy law’ at all, but
merely restates its own economic assumptions”).
65. See supra note 5 (citing provisions of the Code).
66. To be fair, the creditors’ bargain theory seeks to critique bankruptcy for its inefficiencies,
and so it is not unexpected that it fails to engage with the Code’s non-efficiency rationales.
67. Virtue ethics appears to have heavily influenced Anglo-American law. See Claeys, supra
note 19, at 901 (contending that virtue ethics “heavily influenced Anglo-American property
law”); see also Strang, supra note 20, at 2026. Virtue-based principles are the basis of
contemporary private law. See GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS, supra note 31, at 1–9
(1991) (explaining the progression of contract law to its modern state).
68. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939).
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law because it is grounded in principles that could not have shaped
bankruptcy law.69 The creditors’ bargain model is founded on
principles derived from the clever insights of efficiency-minded
academics, such as the effect of bankruptcy discharges on interest
rates.70 These principles were only “discovered” because the economic
approach to law requires efficiency-minded academics to look for costs
to be avoided.71 Efficiency is relevant to bankruptcy law, but it is not
the only relevant value.72 The creditors’ bargain model cannot provide
an accurate description of the current state of the law because its
efficiency-minded evaluative framework is not up to the task.73
C. The Need for a New Bankruptcy Theory
Some bankruptcy scholars claim that our bankruptcy laws are the
product of “social exigency, moral conflict, and political compromise”

69. Efficiency is surely relevant to bankruptcy law, but is not the only relevant virtue. James
Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 2 (2002) [hereinafter
Gordley, Moral Foundations] (arguing that the virtues of prudence and distributive and
commutative justice enable people to live their lives); see also Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values,
supra note 18, at 739–40 (discussing the limitations of the economic account of bankruptcy law).
70. See Gordley, Moral Foundations, supra note 69, at 8 (discussing attempts to explain the
doctrine of necessity in terms of economic efficiency); see also Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values,
supra note 18 at 739–40 (detailing the shortcomings of the economic approach); Robert K.
Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
13 (1994) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Optimal Bankruptcy].
71. See Gordley, Moral Foundations, supra note 69, at 6 (“[T]heir economic approach
requires them to look for a cost to be avoided.”); see also Ronald Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA.
L. REV. 1201, 1205–06 (1977) (discussing consequentialist arguments in the context of debates
about rights); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 154 (1973)
(noting that although there was a shift toward an economic model, some judges retained concern
for traditional concepts like “reasonableness”); Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in
the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1047 (1978) (noting that while efficiency
“has been an influential factor in prior law,” it “has not been the only influential factor”).
72. It is important to note that neither virtue jurisprudence nor bankruptcy law is antagonistic
toward the economic analysis of the law. Far from it. Many Bankruptcy Code provisions require
judges to promote efficiency and avoid unnecessary costs. For example, the bankruptcy system
embraces some overtly utilitarian principles, including the requirement that creditors with a state
law right to repossess collateral be forestalled from doing so. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). This
imposes a cost on the individual creditor in order to maximize aggregate welfare for all creditors.
In addition, § 363 requires that debtors accept the highest and best offer when selling assets of the
estate, which courts have interpreted to mean the highest monetary offer. Id. § 363. Sections
327–330 address judicial oversight of the fees for bankruptcy professionals, and are intended to
help control costs. Id. §§ 327–330. Section 105 is often used to justify consolidation of multiple
bankruptcy cases for procedural purposes, which also helps to reduce costs. Id. § 105. Efficiency
and thrift are both virtues that may apply in bankruptcy. However, while these goals are not
anathema to virtue jurisprudence or bankruptcy law, neither are they their raison d’être.
73. See AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 78 (Basil Blackwell ed., 1987) (“[T]he
distancing of economics from ethics has impoverished welfare economics, and also weakened the
basis of a good deal of descriptive and predictive economics.”).

THE VIRTUE IN BANKRUPTCY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

The Virtue in Bankruptcy

10/17/2013 10:50 AM

249

rather than “the logical outcome of ethical principles consciously
adopted and consistently applied by perfectly rational legislators.”74 As
a result, these scholars—notably David Carlson—have claimed that it is
“unrealistic to expect to find ethical principles that would justify all of
bankruptcy law.”75 Carlson is correct that it is specious to assume that
any particular theoretical model can possibly explain every detail and
every rule in an area of law as complex as bankruptcy. 76 Nevertheless,
our bankruptcy laws represent the collective judgments about
bankruptcy policy that various Congresses have reached over time.77
This Article assumes that these value judgments are mostly rational and
“based on logically coherent reasons.”78 Any mostly rational, logically
coherent system should contain some common principles that have
some unifying force for that system.
As such, there are at least two reasons to continue to pursue the hunt
for a deep structure in bankruptcy. First, most extant bankruptcy
theories, including the creditors’ bargain theory, are normative theories
that seek to offer an authoritative theoretical perspective from which to
criticize the current bankruptcy system and determine what ends an
ideal bankruptcy system should seek to achieve. Most of these
proposals fail to make any assertions whatsoever about the reality of the

74. Korobkin, Normative Foundations, supra note 18, at 543 (citing David G. Carlson
Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1389 (1987)); see also Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, supra note 14, at 778 (“I see bankruptcy as a more complex and ultimately less confined
process than [Professor] Baird.”). Bankruptcy is highly politicized and therefore bankruptcy law
will always have elements that are incoherent from any theoretical prospective. See Levitin,
supra note 45, at 1451–58 (discussing the “politics of bankruptcy”).
75. Korobkin, Normative Foundations, supra note 18, at 543 (1993) (citing David G. Carlson,
Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1389 (1987)); see also John D. Ayer, Through
Chapter 11 with Gun or Camera, But Probably Not Both: A Field Guide, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 883,
884 (1994) (asserting that there are different approaches to bankruptcy); Raymond T. Nimmer,
Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions,
36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1023 (1987) (contending that it would be “irresponsible . . . to suggest that
for all outcomes, special and general protections in bankruptcy can be justified by one, or even
several overarching policies”); Linda J. Rusch, Bankruptcy Reorganization Jurisprudence:
Matters of Belief, Faith, and Hope-Stepping into the Fourth Dimension, 55 MONT. L. REV. 9, 16
(1994) (asserting that the “beliefs and values” at the core of bankruptcy law cannot “be
subject[ed] to the test of truth or falsity, but are really matters of individual faith and aspiration”).
76. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the
Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 441,
452–53 (1994) (arguing that bankruptcy models are merely “gross, oversimplified
approximations of reality”).
77. Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 94.
78. Id.; see also Levitin, supra note 45, at 1405 (suggesting that a proper theoretical
understanding of bankruptcy must be based on a political theory). Even at their best, models are
“gross, oversimplified approximations of reality.” Ponoroff, supra note 76, at 452–53. However,
models have explanatory prowess specifically because of their reductive nature.
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current bankruptcy system.79 No other theory of corporate bankruptcy
law has done an adequate job of providing a positive account of current
bankruptcy law and the equitable principles that have motivated
corporate bankruptcy law and policy since its inception.80 As such, it
appears that corporate bankruptcy law is currently “under-theorized,”
and this Article seeks to fill this gap in the literature. For many, a
theory that offers a positive account of our current bankruptcy system
would be a welcome alternative.81 An alternative account of corporate
bankruptcy law that is able to tap into insights about the purposes of our
bankruptcy policies would be even more valuable.
Second, virtue jurisprudence can provide a useful theoretical
counterweight to existing corporate bankruptcy theories and prevent the
terms of the debate from becoming solely focused on any one theory. If
this Article’s sole accomplishment is to leave readers with an
introduction to virtue ethics, and the first glimmers of virtue ethics’
potential explanatory power for corporate bankruptcy law, it will be a
success. As it stands, corporate bankruptcy scholarship has been
dominated by the creditors’ bargain approach for some time.82 This is
not surprising because, with a few notable exceptions,83 there has not
been a serious theoretical alternative presented. Unless a vibrant
alternative theory can be presented, the very terms of the debate may
continue to shift into the language of economics.84 For those scholars
who remain doubtful of the benefits of an exclusive and relentless focus
79. See LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, supra note 61, at 1309 (noting that economists
have failed to explain how they will deal with current problems in implementing their proposals);
see also Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 116 (asserting that Professor Jackson’s
“common pool account” of bankruptcy law fails as an explanatory theory); Jody S. Kraus,
Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of
Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 358 (2007) (noting that some scholars
remain “mystified that anyone takes [economic analysis] seriously, especially as an explanatory
theory” (emphasis in original)); cf. Zamir & Medina, supra note 63, at 391 (suggesting that
deontologically constrained cost-benefit analysis would make economic analysis “descriptively
more valid”).
80. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting that bankruptcy laws force bankruptcy
courts to consider equitable principles like fairness, honesty, and justice).
81. But see LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, supra note 61, at 1310–11 (calling for a better
approach that does not “miss most of the economic interrelationships”).
82. See Susan Block-Lieb, A Humanistic Vision of Bankruptcy Law, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 471, 472 (1998) (acknowledging that economic analysis has dominated bankruptcy
scholarship); Claeys, supra note 19, at 893 (same).
83. Among those offering competing theories are Donald Korobkin, Ronald Mann, Karen
Gross, and Lynn M. LoPucki. See, e.g., Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 78–79
(noting the existence of competing theories).
84. For some, this is precisely the point. See LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, supra note
61, at 1310–11 (suggesting that creditors’ bargain theorists are engaged in “a deadly serious
endeavor” to dominate the terms of the debate over bankruptcy law).
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on economic efficiency and ex ante entitlements, a competing
framework for understanding bankruptcy law would be very valuable.85
II. VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE AS BANKRUPTCY THEORY
A. Introducing Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is the oldest of the three major schools of moral
philosophy,86 and is rooted in the philosophies of Aristotle and Thomas
Aquinas, among others.87 Like alternative theories, virtue ethics is not a
monolithic approach to moral philosophy. Nevertheless, most accounts
of virtue ethics focus on the relationship between law and character, and
tend to be concerned with the lived experiences of human life.88 They
tend to offer a normative account of contemporary moral issues
predicated on encouraging virtues such as fairness, equity, and justice in
human relations.89 While virtue ethics has ancient roots, it is also
essentially a new theory, and one that draws on recent developments in
moral philosophy to update its historical antecedents.90
Virtue ethical accounts generally focus on how citizens may achieve
eudaimonia (human flourishing).91
Virtue ethics conceives of
eudaimonia as the ultimate good: the state of being that all people
should seek to achieve.92 Virtue ethicists also believe that achieving the
ultimate good is only possible by acting in accordance with the
85. The debate in the corporate bankruptcy literature parallels debates happening in other
disciplines as well. See, e.g., Penalver, supra note 57, at 863–64 (offering virtue ethics as an
alternative to the dominant law and economics model of property law).
86. See Strang, supra note 20, at 2017 (recognizing that “[t]he other two competing ethical
traditions are deontology and consequentialism”).
87. Other noted advocates of virtue ethics include Confucius, Hume, the Late Scholastics,
Plato, and the Stoics. See Rebecca L. Walker & Philip L. Ivanhoe, Introduction to WORKING
VIRTUE: VIRTUE ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS 1, 3 (Rebecca L. Walker &
Philip L. Ivanhoe eds., 2007) (noting proponents of virtue ethics); see also MACINTYRE, supra
note 19, at 118 (same); Gordley, Moral Foundations, supra note 69, at 1 (same).
88. Solum, Theory of Judging, supra note 27, at 179; see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 99
(discussing the need for a theory that “provides not just an abstract set of principles”).
89. See Walker & Ivanhoe, supra note 87, at 3 (asserting that while a variety of approaches to
virtue ethics exist, “all share something in common by offering virtue-based analyses of
contemporary moral issues”). Among the various normative approaches to virtue theory are those
offered by Alasdair MacIntyre, Julia Driver, and Rosalind Hursthouse. See JULIA DRIVER, The
Virtues and Human Nature, in HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE?: ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES 116, 116
(Roger Crisp ed., 1996); HURSTHOUSE, supra note 19, at 28–29; MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at
150–52.
90. Rosalind Hursthouse’s book, ON VIRTUE ETHICS, offers an excellent introduction to virtue
ethics. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 19, at 1–25; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 146–
64.
91. Eudaimonia is discussed further in the text accompanying notes 21–29.
92. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 140 (noting the link between virtue and happiness).

THE VIRTUE IN BANKRUPTCY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

252

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/17/2013 10:50 AM

[Vol. 45

virtues.93 People must practice acting virtuously and only by repeated,
conscious efforts to internalize virtuous behavior can eudaimonia be
achieved.94
Virtue ethics relies on concepts of vice and, correspondingly, of
virtue.95 Virtue refers to something like an admirable character trait,
and simultaneously, to a person’s propensity to act in accordance with
that character trait.96 Acting virtuously helps a person “fit into” and
contribute to society.97 Virtuous action requires more than simply
acting in accordance with the virtues, and is not simply “the result of a
cost/benefit calculation of utility.”98 A virtuous action is the right
action taken for the right reasons;99 “right action” requires a unity of
reason and feeling.100 Vice is the converse. Vice refers to something
93. See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 713 (“At its broadest level,
Aristotelian virtue causes human beings to be happy and function well.” (citation omitted)).
94. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 4–5 (1992).
95. ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS 147 (2000) [hereinafter
HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS, AND OTHER ANIMALS]; see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at
103 (defining Aristotelian virtue as “all-round personal excellence”).
96. See Peter Koller, Law, Morality, and Virtue, in WORKING VIRTUE: VIRTUE ETHICS AND
CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 192, 192 (“The concept of virtue refers to
the character traits of persons, their practical attitudes or dispositions, which have some
motivating force for their conduct.” (emphasis in original)); see also HURSTHOUSE, supra note
95, at 147 (“A virtue is . . . a good, or admirable, or praiseworthy character trait . . . .” (emphasis
in original)); MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 191 (offering a “partial and tentative definition” of
virtue as “an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to
achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us
from achieving any such goods”); Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 716 (noting that
virtue is “just the right amount” of a particular trait (citation omitted)); Jeffrey Nesteruk, Law,
Virtue, and the Corporation, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 473, 476 (1996) (noting that virtues are “contextbound” and “cannot be defined in the abstract”).
97. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 107.
98. Id. at 109; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 149 (arguing that an “educated moral
agent . . . does what is virtuous because it is virtuous”); Anthony Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal
Liability, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 193, 195–96. An example may be helpful. Honesty is a
virtue represented by “the ideal of straight dealing, fair play, common knowledge, and open
inquiry.” See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 192. To say that a person has the virtue of honesty
refers both to the fact that a person generally tells the truth and to that person’s disposition to
truth telling. The virtue of honesty is something more than simply the principle “do not lie,”
because a truly honest person is one that does not even think of lying. See id. at 194–95. It is
also not enough for a person to act out of obligation, fear of punishment, or for similar reasons. A
person does not possess the virtue of honesty if she tells the truth for any reason other than
because telling the truth is the right thing to do.
99. MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 149.
100. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 19, at 28; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 122, 149
(stating that “[v]irtues just are those qualities which sustain a free man in his role and which
manifest themselves in those actions which his role requires” and that “[v]irtues are dispositions
not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways”); Kyron Huigens, On
Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 35, at 214,
214 (“Virtue, for Artistotle, was . . . a quality of exemplary practical judgment by which the agent
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like a person’s despicable character traits and a disposition to act in
accordance with that character trait.101
Virtues are not abstract concepts.102 In the abstract, virtues lack
moral content; they gain meaning only in the context of human
activity.103 Considering a virtue in the abstract renders the content of
that virtue incoherent and meaningless.104 Put differently, “[v]irtues
tend to be context-bound.”105 For example, charity is often considered
to be a virtue.106 However, if a person is overly-charitable, that person
may be considered foolish.107 Consider both a single parent working a
low-wage job to support his family and a wealthy socialite who doesn’t
have such concerns. Charity might require that each contribute a
personally significant amount to the needy, but the absolute amount of
each individual’s charitable giving will depend on their particular
circumstances. As a result, society might judge the single parent to be
generous to a fault if he were to give his family’s grocery money to a
charitable cause instead of buying enough food for his children. Yet,
society might consider the wealthy socialite stingy and lacking in
charity if he donated twice as much to the same cause, because doing so
does not deprive his loved ones of essential needs, and is a less
personally significant amount. Because the virtue of charity is contextbound, society may fairly expect that the wealthy should contribute
more to charity than the poor.108
This example also highlights the Aristotelian concept of the “golden
mean.” The golden mean suggests that virtues are just the right amount
of a particular trait for a particular situation.109 Virtues are not just
does right because the right is what he wants to do . . . .”).
101. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 95, at 147 (“[A] vice is a bad, or despicable or
unpraiseworthy character trait.”).
102. See Nesteruk, supra note 96, at 476 (noting that “virtues are context bound”).
103. Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
288, 338 (1993) (noting that virtues “acquire their coherence and meaning only by their unique
capacity to assist a person to achieve excellence in particular varieties of human activity”).
104. Id.
105. MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 123; SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 167; Nesteruk, supra
note 96, at 476.
106. Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, No More Quandaries: A Look at Virtue Through the Eyes of
Robert Solomon, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 117, 119 (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, at pt. II-II, qq. 1–27 (Fathers of the English Dominican trans., 1948)); see also
HEIDI M. HURD & RALPH BRUBAKER, DEBTS AND THE DEMANDS OF CONSCIENCE: THE VIRTUE
OF BANKRUPTCY (forthcoming April 1, 2014)) (on file with author).
107. See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text (discussing the golden mean).
108. The Bible also suggests as much: “For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be
much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more.” Luke
12:48 (King James).
109. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 372 (“[T]he equal is some intermediate between excess
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labels, but rather involve choices along a spectrum. For example, the
virtue of charity requires giving an appropriate amount: not so little as
to be uncharitable and not so much as to be a spendthrift.110
Virtues are also role-related.111 As the nature of appropriate action
differs from role to role, we should expect people who occupy different
roles to exhibit different virtues.112 For example, we can contrast the
respective roles of a judge and a legislator.113 Society has very different
expectations for individuals occupying these positions. People might
believe that a Congresswoman who aligns her views with those of her
constituents on a contentious political issue is doing her job well and
exhibits the virtue of prudence.114 By contrast, a judge who molded her
views to those of the electorate would fairly open herself up to claims
that she had behaved imprudently, perhaps even corruptly. In part, the
difference between prudent and imprudent action depends on the actor
because our conceptions of virtuous action are role-related. Legislators
should be responsive to their constituents, but judges should decide
cases based on principles divorced from popular sentiment.115
The contextual and role-dependent nature of virtue means that acting
virtuously requires more than simplistic conformity to a code of
behavior116 and that virtue cannot be reduced to definite and universal

and deficiency.”); see also Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 716 (“Virtue involves
making a choice between two extremes . . . .”).
110. Bravery is the prototypical example used to explain the concept of the golden mean. The
virtue of bravery refers to the mean between two opposite choices along the spectrum of
fearfulness. At one extreme end of the spectrum is rashness. Rashness is the state of having a
deficiency of fear. At the other end of the spectrum is cowardice. Cowardice is the state of
having an excess of fear. A person having the virtue of bravery has the right amount of fear,
given her particular situation. In this way, a brave person may be said to occupy the mean
between rashness and cowardice. See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 716
(discussing the virtue of bravery).
111. MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 129; SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 196 (discussing this
point and adding that virtues also vary among different cultures); Nesteruk, supra note 96, at 476.
Some empirical evidence suggests that roles are important in explaining behavior. See, e.g.,
CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY 123–25 (2005) (discussing evidence drawn
from ultimatum games); Herbert Gintis et al., Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: Origins,
Evidence, and Consequences, in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS 3, 8–18
(Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005).
112. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 196–97.
113. I am indebted to Jeffrey Nesteruk for this example. See Nesteruk, supra note 96, at 476–
77.
114. Of course, we would also like our Congresspersons to have the virtues of honesty and
integrity: to tell the truth, avoid shady or illicit dealings, and refuse bribes. See SOLOMON, supra
note 21, at 169 (discussing the kind of integrity we hope for in politicians).
115. Nesteruk, supra note 96, at 476–77.
116. Virtues “cannot be dictated according to abstract rules or principles.” SOLOMON, supra
note 21, at 109, 233. “There is no simple calculus or decision procedure” for business. Id. at
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rules.117 The lack of definitive rules recognizes that a certain amount of
subjectivity inheres in all decisions, but it does not mean that all
decisions are correct just because a decision maker says so. Although
somewhat fuzzier than deontological or consequentialist decision
making, virtue ethics can provide guidance to decision makers. It does
so through the use of the intellectual virtue known as practical wisdom
(phronesis), which is discussed further below.118
B. Three Reasons Why Virtue Jurisprudence Can Undergird a
Descriptive Theory of Bankruptcy Law
Virtue jurisprudence offers an interesting new way of thinking about
bankruptcy law, and is better suited than existing theories to explain
some of bankruptcy law’s key features for at least three reasons. First,
virtue jurisprudence appears grounded in the same values and principles
that underlie bankruptcy law.119
Second, adopting a virtue
jurisprudential framework for analyzing how bankruptcy judges balance
the competing demands of bankruptcy law’s multiple dimensions and
incommensurable ends can help provide a rich and fulsome
understanding of the law.120
In particular, phronesis—virtue
jurisprudence’s decision-making apparatus—can explain how
bankruptcy judges reconcile these demands and arrive at an appropriate
decision in a particular case.121 Third, virtue ethics’ simultaneous
consideration of means and ends can offer insights into how bankruptcy
judges use their Bankruptcy Code-sanctioned discretion and commercial
judgment.122 Each is discussed in greater detail below.
179. Nor is there one for bankruptcy.
117. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1995); see also
SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 179 (“[T]hose who try to follow such a calculus or procedure will
almost inevitably get caught up in its simple-mindedness.”).
118. See infra Part II.B.2; see also supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
119. See Gordley, Moral Foundations, supra note 69, at 2–5 (discussing the moral
foundations of private law); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 257 (suggesting that modern
morality is Aristotelian). Particularly as compared to the creditors’ bargain theory, virtue
jurisprudence and bankruptcy law share a notably parallel vocabulary. See Korobkin,
Rehabilitating Values, supra note 18, at 739–40 (noting that “the economic account . . . neglect[s]
bankruptcy law’s unique history and distinctive function[s]”).
120. Certain values take lexical priority over others despite a claim of incommensurability.
See Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations, supra note 57, at 1202 (noting the “plural valued approach
inspired by Aristotle”). As such, the notion of incommensurability does not mean that two values
are incomparable. See generally Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37 (noting that while
“goods are not assessed along a single metric,” public and private choices can be evaluated).
121. Phronesis and practical wisdom are used interchangeably throughout this Article. See
Feldman, supra note 35, at 58 (noting that phronesis is sometimes translated as “practical
wisdom”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 153 (discussing phronesis).
122. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012) (allowing the bankruptcy court to approve a
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1. The Shared Language of Virtue
Both virtue jurisprudence and bankruptcy law evince concern with
virtues such as honesty, fairness, equity, and justice.123 To some extent,
these virtues provide a foundation for all law;124 however, bankruptcy
law appears to draw particularly heavily on notions of virtue. The use
of a shared, virtue-centric vocabulary suggests that a greater
understanding of virtue jurisprudence can lead to insights about the
Bankruptcy Code.
For example, both virtue jurisprudence and bankruptcy law
emphasize virtues such as justice and equity. 125 In virtue jurisprudence,
justice requires that each person receive what he or she is due, which is
directly proportional to his or her merit.126 Bankruptcy law mirrors this
conception of justice in its focus on ensuring that similarly situated
creditors receive equal distributions from the estate, unless they agree
otherwise.127 In this way, both virtue jurisprudence and the Bankruptcy
Code evidence a shared concern with justice as equality.
The creditors’ bargain theory suggests that bankruptcy law should
focus relentlessly on economic efficiency, thereby ensuring that the

plan if it is feasible, but allowing the bankruptcy courts to define feasibility); see also Matthew
Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar: Imposing a Preliminary Injunction
Standard for Objections to Section 363 Sales, 62 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2012) (noting that
bankruptcy judges enjoy an enormous amount of discretion in approving § 363 sales).
123. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of these concepts
to virtue ethics); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing specific Code sections
that draw on these virtues).
124. Like most law, bankruptcy law was built on the foundations of virtue and crafted by
lawmakers indoctrinated in the philosophy of virtue. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 257
(discussing the “distinctive kind of morality” of the Aristotelian tradition which is “so
predominant in modern conceptions of morality”); see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 17
(“Business . . . depends upon and presupposes the virtues and that basic sense of community and
minimal mutual trust without which no activities of production or exchange or mutual benefit
would be possible.”); cf. GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS, supra note 31, at 1–10 (discussing
the virtues underlying contract law).
125. See supra notes 3–7.
126. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 232 (“The basic idea is that justice has much to do with
merit—giving each student what he or she deserves on the basis of effort and accomplishment.”
(emphasis in original)).
127. The ability to claw back payments to creditors is grounded in an attempt to equalize
distributions among creditors and avoid the debtor’s ability to prefer one creditor over another.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (providing bankruptcy trustees with the power to avoid preferential
transfers); see also Sydney Krause, Homer Kripke & Charles Segilson, The Code and the
Bankruptcy Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 292 (1967) (“A cornerstone of the bankruptcy structure
is the principle that equal treatment for those similarly situated must be achieved.”). There are, of
course, many instances where the Code authorizes a departure from this norm. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 507 (providing priority payment of the claims of certain special interests). Nevertheless,
these exceptions only help prove the rule.
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pool of assets distributed to creditors is as large as possible.128 This
theory also suggests that ex ante contract rights should be respected to
the greatest extent possible.129 While bankruptcy law is concerned
about efficiency and contract rights, it is also concerned about fairness,
justice, and other similar principles, and with the notion that the
enforcement of contracts “should not offend deeply held social
norms.”130 As a result, virtue jurisprudence may be better suited to
provide a positive theory of bankruptcy law than alternative theories,
which have a more limited focus because they do not rest on the same
foundations.131
For example, 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g) provides that a court may not
modify retiree benefit plans unless the court finds that, among other
things, modification is necessary to permit the debtor’s reorganization,
all “affected parties are treated fairly and equitably,” and modification is
“clearly favored by the balance of the equities.”132 The Code’s
references to fairness and equity are not defined, and courts appear to
rely, in part, on a virtue ethical definition to give contest to these
phrases.133 One example is found in the 2006 case of In re Kaiser
Aluminum Corporation.134
In that case, the debtors were a corporate group of twenty-six
companies involved in the aluminum industry (“Kaiser”). Due to weak
industry conditions, credit lines that could not be rolled over, ongoing
asbestos litigation, and legacy obligations to retirees, Kaiser filed for
bankruptcy.135 While in bankruptcy, Kaiser sought to terminate six of
its pension plans, which covered more than 13,000 current and former
128. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (explaining that the creditors’ bargain
model provides that the optimal bankruptcy system should maximize the expected value of the
assets of the bankruptcy estate).
129. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
130. See Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 14, at 780; supra note 5 (discussing specific
Code sections that draw on these virtues).
131. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 257.
132. The relevant text of 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g) reads:
(g) The court shall enter an order providing for modification in the payment of retiree
benefits if the court finds that—
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the requirements
of subsection (f);
(2) the authorized representative of the retirees has refused to accept such proposal
without good cause; and
(3) such modification is necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and
assures that all creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably, and is clearly favored by the balance of the equities.
133. See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum, 456 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006).
134. Id. at 330.
135. Id. at 331.
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workers.136 If Kaiser were able to shed these obligations, its ability to
reorganize would be improved, but covered employees would end up
receiving only those minimum benefits guaranteed by the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (the “PBGC”).137
In determining whether the debtor should be allowed to terminate its
six pension plans, the court had to decide if the debtor could consider
these pension plans in the aggregate, or if it was required to consider
them on an individual basis. It was undisputed that if the debtor
analyzed each plan separately, it was not necessary to terminate all six
in order to facilitate the company’s reorganization.138 In other words,
the debtor had sufficient resources to meet its obligations under some of
the pension plans and to reorganize. Employees who participated in
plans that were not terminated would receive their full, expected
benefits in the normal course. But employees who participated in plans
that were terminated would receive only the PBGC-guaranteed
minimum amounts, which were often substantially lower than the fully
vested pensions due to plan participants. The statute is silent on
whether decisions to terminate can be made using an aggregate
approach or if each plan must be separately considered.
The Third Circuit allowed the debtor to terminate all six plans despite
the PBGC’s objection.139 Among other reasons, the court held that the
plan-by-plan approach advocated by the PBGC was arbitrary and
therefore inequitable within the meaning of § 1114(g). 140 The PBGC’s
approach was arbitrary and inequitable because it would have forced the
debtor to pick and choose among similar plans—often involving
members of the same union—without any standards to guide its choices.
The court’s focus on avoiding arbitrary and inequitable action reflects
some of the same considerations that a virtue ethicist would use.
Although the result was that more employees ended up receiving
smaller pensions than they might have otherwise, the Third Circuit
determined that this was the equitable result because it avoided arbitrary
decision making.
Although the result in In re Kaiser is not an obviously just result, this
case is an example of a court speaking in and drawing on virtue ethical
terms to give content to some of the obligations of the bankruptcy
courts. Admittedly, it is counter-intuitive to claim that equity has been

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 332.
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 342.
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done when fewer individuals receive the benefits that they anticipated
receiving. However, the Third Circuit clearly manifested a concern
with avoiding arbitrary determinations, which lies at the heart of the
virtue of equity. It is also important to note that if the court had
explicitly considered the virtue of justice, it may well have reached a
different conclusion. The In re Kaiser court appeared to use a partial
conception of virtue jurisprudence to reach its conclusion. This Article
suggests that judges should rely more explicitly on virtue jurisprudential
conceptions of bankruptcy law in order to decide cases involving
statutes that speak in virtue jurisprudential terms.
2. Practical Wisdom
Practical wisdom is a particular type of virtue—an intellectual
virtue—that helps order and make sense of the potentially competing
demands of the other virtues.141 Practical wisdom is particularly
important to virtue jurisprudence because virtue jurisprudence does not
offer a definite list of virtues that apply in a particular case. 142 Instead,
virtue jurisprudence offers a method for identifying the relevant virtues
and for applying these inherently general virtues to particular cases.
Practical wisdom can be understood as the intellectual quality of
decision makers that enables them to perform this task well and thereby
reach the correct result in a particular situation.143
One way to think about practical wisdom is by considering the
concept of the virtuous person.144 A virtuous person is one who
possesses and exercises only the virtues, and who shuns vice.145
Whether or not such a person actually exists, the virtuous person sets
the standard for how judges should think about how people ought to
act.146 In many ways, the virtuous person is a construct akin to the
141. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 174 (discussing practical wisdom).
142. See supra notes 111–17 (explaining that virtue is contextual and role-dependent, and
therefore irreducible to a definite rule).
143. See Solum, Natural Justice, supra note 36, at 84 (“Practical wisdom is the virtue that
enables one to make good choices in the choosing of legal ends and means.”); see also
HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 19, at 40 (noting that practical wisdom “might be
required both to interpret the rules and to determine which rule was most appropriately to be
applied in a particular case” (emphasis in original)).
144. See HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS, AND OTHER ANIMALS, supra note 95, at 148
(discussing the “virtuous person” concept).
145. See Solum, Theory of Judging, supra note 27, at 189 (describing judicial virtues); see
also HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS, AND OTHER ANIMALS, supra note 95, at 147 (contending
that virtuous people condemn those who are “self-interested, mean, callous, cruel, spiteful,
dishonest, silly and thoughtless, unjust, dishonorable, disloyal, lazy, unfair, irresponsible,
uncaring, cowardly, materialistic”).
146. See HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS, AND OTHER ANIMALS, supra note 95, at 148.
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reasonable person standard in contract law: it is a hypothetical decision
maker against which judges can measure the appropriateness of certain
actions in particular circumstances.147
Practical wisdom requires the decision maker to take two actions.
First, decision makers must identify the relevant virtues. And second,
they must consider what decision these virtuous traits would dispose a
virtuous person to make.148 In easy cases, practical wisdom can be
regarded as a working theory of the world on which people rely,
perhaps unconsciously, when making decisions.149 For example, a
person possessing the virtue of honesty might instinctively return any
excess change given to them by a clerk after having made a purchase. It
is not necessary for a habitually honest person to reflect on the relevant
virtues and the proper course of actions because they have internalized
this decision-making process.
But practical wisdom is also a distinct form of judgment that enables
a person to bring to bear her past experiences to help inform the right
action to take in a new situation.150 It can also be thought of as the
combination of common sense, refined by practice and experience, and
analogical reasoning.151 In more difficult cases, decision makers may
need to reason more consciously about the relevant virtues and the
actions a virtuous person would take. Put differently, decision makers
may need to perform a sort of thought experiment to ascertain how a
person possessing the specific virtues relevant to the particular situation

147. Id.; see also Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 730–31 (contending that
virtue jurisprudence can suggest common themes, provide guidance to judges, and give context to
broad legal standards). Note that because virtue ethics is context specific, see supra text
accompanying notes 99–105, the correct way to behave will differ with the circumstances. See
Chapin Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences, and Virtue Jurisprudence, 71 U. PITT. L.
REV. 279, 282 (2010) [hereinafter Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences] (asserting that
practical wisdom “reject[s] formalism in favor of contextualism”); see also MACINTYRE, supra
note 19, at 123 (noting the context-specific nature of virtues); Sunstein, Incommensurability,
supra note 37, at 852–53 (contending “most answers must be developed in the context of
particular problems”).
148. See Feldman, supra note 35, at 58–59 (contending that “good judgment in the choice and
pursuit of one’s ends” is a virtuous trait); see also HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS, AND OTHER
ANIMALS, supra note 95, at 147 (asserting that “[v]irtue ethics assesses people and actions in
terms of the virtues and vices” (emphasis in original)).
149. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 195 (stating that virtues become engrained in a person’s
character); Lawrence B. Solum, A Virtue-Centered Account of Equity and the Rule of Law, in
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 35, at 142, 159–60 [hereinafter Solum, Virtue-Centered
Account] (noting that judges using practical wisdom act unconsciously).
150. See Solum, Virtue-Centered Account, supra note 149, at 160 (asserting that
“experience . . . is required for practical wisdom”).
151. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 175–76 (noting that “[d]ecision making . . . takes
practice” and that good judgment can only be developed through experience).
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would behave in that situation.152 Through this experiment, the
virtuous decision maker engages in a virtue-centered decision process
and chooses a “correct” decision from among the available
alternatives.153
The process by which bankruptcy judges evaluate the multiple
demands of various potentially applicable but competing bankruptcy
policies can be usefully compared to practical wisdom.154 Bankruptcy
courts must do more than simply balance the expected costs and
benefits of a particular decision. Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity,
and bankruptcy judges must be able to determine which rule is the most
appropriate for a particular case and to correctly apply inherently
general laws to the facts of that case.155 Although this may seem
simply like guesswork, excellent judges do not simply guess at the
correct answer.156 Rather, repeated encounters with similar problems
refine a judge’s ability to analogize to similar cases, which can be
developed into an internalized set of rules and procedures for deciding
cases.157
Although bankruptcy courts are generally required to follow black
letter law when making decisions, as courts of equity it is expected that
they must sometimes depart from the law in order to do justice in

152. See Feldman, supra note 35, at 52–53 (noting that “virtue ethics identifies particular
traits as more or less worthy, asks what sort of acts these traits dispose a person to perform, and
then rates acts according to whether or not they are of the kind a person possessed of worthy
character traits would perform”).
153. This requires a context-specific, deliberative evaluation. Id. at 53. It belittles the role of
judges to reduce such inquiries into questions of maximizing utility. See id. (noting the necessity
of context-specific deliberation); see also HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 19, at 12
(noting that virtues become “strongly entrenched” and are difficult to change, keeping a “virtuous
person” virtuous).
154. See HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 19, at 12 (noting that practical wisdom is
the “ability to reason correctly about practical matters”).
155. See id. at 40 (contending that “a certain amount of virtue and corresponding moral or
practical wisdom . . . might be required both to interpret the rules and to determine which rule
was most appropriately to be applied in a particular case” (emphasis in original)); Solum, Natural
Justice, supra note 36, at 173 (recognizing that judges must possess practical wisdom).
156. Through experience, judges digest and synthesize the various competing concerns and
considerations involved in common disputes, so that their decision-making may appear
spontaneous. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 233 (noting that the accumulation of precedent
gives rise to more efficient decision-making). Acting virtuously develops into a kind of
understanding as to how to act, but a person must also consciously aim to act virtuously and
practice doing so. Id. at 5, 174; see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 105 (discussing the role of
intuition in bankruptcy decision-making).
157. See Francis J. Mootz III, Vico’s “Ingenious Method” and Legal Education, 83 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1261, 1277 (2008) (recognizing that “expert practice is the source of formal
knowledge about practice”).
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particular cases.158 This is sensible; the existence of consistently
followed rules helps ensure predictability, certainty, and respect of
legitimate expectations.159 At the same time, granting bankruptcy
courts the powers of equity allows them to fill the gaps left when
legislators draft laws of general applicability. These powers also allow
judges to make exceptions in cases where the straightforward
application of the law would lead to unanticipated or unjust results.160
In these ways, equity furthers legislative intent.
Equity is particularly important in the bankruptcy context, where
bankruptcy judges have more than just the interstitial gap-filling power
that all courts have.161 Several Code provisions specifically direct
bankruptcy judges to consider equitable principles. 162 In addition,
section 105 of the Code is also a powerful tool in a bankruptcy judge’s
equitable arsenal.163 Although several circuit courts have said that
158. See Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“The essence of equity jurisdiction has
been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mold each decree to the necessities of the
particular case.”); see also Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic
Theories of Law, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 35, at 1, 19 (“A common understanding
of equity is that legal decision makers sometimes ought to depart from the rules in order to do
justice in particular cases.”); Solum, Virtue-Centered Account, supra note 149, at 143 (same).
159. In a virtue jurisprudential account of the law, predictability and certainty are provided by
the use of analogical reasoning, stare decisis, and by focusing on the consequences of decisions.
See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 858 (“Much of the relevant work here is
done in two ways: through analogies and through understanding consequences . . . .”); see also
GROSS, supra note 13, at 217 (noting that “prior decisions and legislative history can help guide
the decision maker” when while leaving room for individualized justice); MACINTYRE, supra
note 19, at 232 (contending that questions cannot be answered without prior formulations of
“rules of justice”); SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 233 (noting that conflicts in law become well
defined through “accumulation of precedents”).
160. See Solum, Theory of Judging, supra note 27, at 205 (contending that virtue theory
allows exceptions for departures from rules); see also Farrelly & Solum, supra note 158, at 19
(asserting justice can require departures from rules).
161. Supreme Court cases like Marrama suggest that bankruptcy courts have broad equitable
powers that non-bankruptcy courts do not enjoy. See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549
U.S. 365, 375 (2007) (noting that bankruptcy judges are given “broad authority” by § 105(a)).
162. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012) (providing that prepetition security agreements
cover related postpetition property unless “the equities of the case” require otherwise); id. §§
1113(b)(1)(A), 1114(f)(1)(A) (allowing the rejection or modification of collective bargaining
agreements and retirements savings plans, respectively, only if “all creditors, the debtor and all of
the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably”); id. § 1129(b) (allowing cramdown unless
the plan discriminates unfairly, or if it is not “fair and equitable”).
163. Id. § 105(a) provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the
raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from,
sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
(emphasis added).
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section 105 does not change bankruptcy courts into roving courts of
equity,164 the Supreme Court recently confirmed that section 105 is a
broad grant of equitable power to the bankruptcy courts.165
For example, in Malley v. Agin (In re Malley), the First Circuit
upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision to surcharge the value of an
otherwise exempt asset as a remedy for a Chapter 7 debtor’s fraudulent
concealment of assets.166 In other words, the court remedied the
debtor’s fraudulent failure to identify assets that could have been used
to repay creditors by depriving him of an asset that he would have
otherwise been able to keep for his own use. The First Circuit found
that the surcharge order was “an appropriate and necessary way to
vindicate” provisions of the Code requiring full and honest disclosure
by a debtor of its assets.167 The First Circuit upheld the bankruptcy
court’s exercise of its section 105 equitable powers, despite the

164. See United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that § 105
“does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise
unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity”); see also S.
Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that “section 105(a)
does not authorize the bankruptcy court to create rights not otherwise available under applicable
law”); GROSS, supra note 13, at 227 (“The equitable powers derive from what is actually in the
Code.”); Timothy E. Graulich, Substantive Consolidation—A Post-Modern Trend, 14 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 527, 553–54 (2006) (emphasizing that “section 105 is not an authorization
to convert the court into a ‘roving commission to do equity’ and may be used only to implement
powers already expressed in the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code” (citation omitted)); Joshua
M. Silverstein, Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court Decision Resolves the Debate
over Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 38
(2006) (“According to this ‘narrow view,’ § 105(a) ‘does not authorize bankruptcy courts to
create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a
roving commission to do equity.’” (citation omitted)).
165. See, e.g., Marrama, 549 U.S. at 375 (noting bankruptcy judges are given “broad
authority” by section 105(a)); In re Rodriguez, 396 B.R. 436, 458 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)
(“Courts . . . have used § 105 to grant plaintiffs a broad range of remedies . . . .”); In re Kellett,
379 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007) (explaining that the Supreme Court “broadly interpreted”
the bankruptcy court’s authority under section 105(a) in Marrama); see also GROSS, supra note
13, at 227 (observing that bankruptcy courts frequently invoke section 105 “when they sense that
the Code produces an unfair result”); Patrick D. Fleming, Credit Derivatives Can Create a
Financial Incentive For Creditors to Destroy a Chapter 11 Debtor: Section 1126(e) and Section
105(a) Provide a Solution, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 189, 211 (2009) (“Section 105 could be
interpreted to provide broad authority for disclosures of certain credit derivative positions to be
obtained.”). The extent of the court’s equitable powers remains hotly contested. See, e.g., Law v.
Seigel (In re Law), 435 Fed. Appx. 697 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (June 17,
2013).
166. 693 F.3d 28, 28 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Alexander J. Nicas, Malley v. Agin,
VOLO.ABI.ORG (Sept. 7, 2012), http://volo.abi.org/malley-v-agin (summarizing the case);
Elizabeth Shumejda, Exempt Assets May Be Surcharged to Remedy Debtor Misconduct, ST.
JOHN’S UNIV. BANKR. CASE BLOG (Jan. 28, 2013), http://stjohns.abiworld.org/node/173 (same);
cf. In re Law, 435 Fed. Appx. at 697 (affirming the lower court’s grant of the surcharge motion).
167. In re Malley, 693 F.3d at 30; see also 11 U.S.C. § 521 (listing debtors’ duties).
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Bankruptcy Code’s failure to specifically authorize surcharge orders as
a remedy for section 521 violations.
The Code does not specifically address how to remedy the fraudulent
concealment of assets, and the court had to determine what remedy—if
any—was the most appropriate in this particular case. The court’s
process of explicitly considering various potentially applicable and
potentially competing principles is akin to practical wisdom. The court
had to consider its role as a court of equity, its powers under section
105, the interests of justice for creditors, the debtor’s violation of his
obligation to be truthful,168 and whether the Code’s silence suggested
that no remedy was available.
There is not one clearly correct solution to the problem the court
confronted.169 Ultimately, the bankruptcy court decided that departing
from the normal rules (i.e., allowing the debtor to keep his exempt
assets) was an appropriate sanction for the debtor’s dishonest conduct.
The court fashioned a remedy to address the debtor’s dishonest conduct
despite the lack of a specific remedy set forth in the Code. In the
absence of clear solutions, and confronted with the need to reconcile the
competing demands of the Code and equity, courts, like the In re Malley
court, explicitly reason in a manner reminiscent of practical wisdom.
This is particularly true in cases where they must consider whether to
depart from the express statutory text. For this reason, virtue
jurisprudence may offer a rich understanding of decision making in the
bankruptcy courts.
Even when bankruptcy judges exercise their equitable powers, their
ability to do justice in a particular case remains constrained.170
Bankruptcy judges, like other judges, are bound by stare decisis.171 In

168. See In re Malley, 693 F.3d at 29 (finding that the debtor failed to disclose approximately
$25,000 in assets).
169. Creditors’ bargain theorists would likely disagree. Despite the difficulty of measuring
and comparing the costs and benefits to parties in various hypothetical states of the world,
creditors’ bargain theorists would likely claim that one state of the world would be the most likely
to maximize the pool of assets to be distributed and demonstrate the most respect for creditor
rights.
170. Their equitable powers are derived from the Code itself. GROSS, supra note 13, at 227;
see also supra note 156 (contending that judges use experience and knowledge to make
decisions).
171. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 858 (describing the consistency that
results from using precedent to inform legal reasoning); see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 233
(discussing the importance of precedent). Principles of stare decisis serve at least three valuable
ends. First, they enhance efficiency. If appellate precedents are followed, there is no need to
litigate the same issue repeatedly in different cases. After a question is decided in an appellate
court, lower courts in that jurisdiction are obligated to follow that decision. Second, binding
appellate precedents foster consistency. If each bankruptcy judge is free to decide an issue for
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addition, analogical reasoning172 can be understood both as comprising
a part of practical wisdom and serving to limit the discretion of lower
court judges.173 When combined with stare decisis, it should be clear
that acknowledging that bankruptcy judges have wide-ranging powers
of equity is not akin to sanctioning subjective and unprincipled
decisions.174 It does mean, however, that there may be several possible
outcomes that are all correct because they are the product of virtuous
decision making.175
3. Virtue Jurisprudence Focuses on Both the Means and Ends of the
Law
The symbiotic analysis of means and ends is the third leg of virtue
jurisprudence’s power to elucidate our bankruptcy laws.176 A virtue
jurisprudential approach requires decision makers to consider two
questions: (i) what are the appropriate outcomes to pursue in a particular
case; and (ii) what is the best way to achieve those outcomes. These
two questions should not be collapsed into a single inquiry, such as

himself or herself, varying results are inevitable. The outcome of the legal questions is likely to
depend on the identity of the judge. Binding appellate precedents thus foster fairness and equity
among litigants. Third, binding appellate precedents foster predictability in the law. Individuals
can know the law and base their conduct accordingly. Lawyers can know the law and advise their
clients accordingly. Without binding precedent, the law is uncertain and the benefits of
predictability are lost. In re Cormier, 382 B.R. 377, 411 n.41 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008) (citing
Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM BANKR. L.J. 109, 128
(1997)).
172. Analogical reasoning is commonly employed by judges to reach the correct outcome in
cases. See Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning, supra note 60, at 787 (discussing the manner in
which judges should reason to produce certain outcomes).
173. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 852 (dissecting analogical
reasoning); see also Mootz, supra note 157, at 1293 (stating that analogical reasoning is “properly
considered a body of knowledge, even though it cannot generate uniquely correct results in given
cases by means of deduction”); John H. Farrar, Reasoning by Analogy in the Law 2 (Feb. 2009)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://njca.anu.edu.au/Professional
%20Development/programs%20by%20year/2009/Judic%20Reas%20papers/farrar.pdf
(“The
method used by Common Law judges in deciding cases is a form of practical reasoning,
combining reasoning by analogy with reasoning by rule and principle.”).
174. Nevertheless, it is true that “[w]hat counts as ‘fair’ . . . is always in some sense a
subjective judgment, based not just on the individual feelings and needs of the immediate
participants, but on the larger collective consciousness as well.” SOLOMON, supra note 21, at
209; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 139 (arguing that conceptions of justice are always
relative and that “[t]here is no such thing as ‘justice-as-such,’” but only context-specific justice
(citation omitted)).
175. The lack of a “right answer” does not mean that it is impossible to reach a correct
decision. Good judgment requires only that a person make the best decision available by
following a virtuous decision-making process. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 179.
176. See generally Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 712 (contending that
“virtue theory reasons about means and ends in a fully symbiotic way”).
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what is the most efficient outcome.177 Instead, virtue jurisprudence
offers this method of reasoning about both the means and ends in order
to explicitly consider both aspects of a problem and arrive at the
virtuous decision for a particular situation.178
This means-ends analysis distinguishes virtue jurisprudence from
other practical philosophies that focus exclusively on the ends to be
pursued (i.e., consequentialism),179 or on one’s duties under the law
(i.e., deontology),180 by forcing a decision maker to more explicitly
account for both means and ends.181 Virtue jurisprudence also differs
from consequentialist theories of law because the end it focuses on—
eudaimonia—is both an internal and a multi-variable concept.182 As
such, promoting the ability of each person to achieve eudaimonia may
involve trade-offs between and among people.183 And different means
of promoting eudaimonia are likely to affect individuals differently.
Therefore, virtue jurisprudence denies that all decisions can be reduced
to a single inquiry without eliding the differential impact that such a
move would have on distributional outcomes.184
Because virtue jurisprudence is concerned with distributional
outcomes, the means that people adopt to obtain particular outcomes are
as relevant to virtue jurisprudential decision making as the outcomes
themselves.185
In addition, virtue jurisprudence recognizes that
177. This is, of course, just what the creditors’ bargain theory requires. See MACINTYRE,
supra note 19, at 198–99 (contending that the summing of happiness “makes no sense”).
178. See Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences, supra note 147, at 299 (asserting that
the “hallmarks of virtue jurisprudence” include “reasoning over both means and ends, and
start[ing] from the premise that the ‘right’ result is probably found at the mean between the two
extremes”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19 at 149 (noting that the exercise of virtue should
be considered not only a means to an end, but also an integral part of the end itself).
179. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 113 (distinguishing virtue theory from utilitarianism
which is a consequentialist theory).
180. See id. (distinguishing virtue theory from deontological theory).
181. See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 738 (“[U]nder a virtue theory
approach, a court could more explicitly account for the parties’ intent as to means, as well as
ends . . . .”).
182. See Alexander, supra note 28, at 751 (claiming that human flourishing is a multivariable
concept and that the multiple relevant components of human flourishing are incommensurable);
see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 178 (noting the incommensurability of “internal goods
and external goods”).
183. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 198–99 (“[C]ultivation of the virtues always may and
often does hinder the achievement of those external goods which are the mark of worldly
success.”).
184. See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 716 (arguing that “a virtue is not a
single, universal good in opposition to a single, universal bad”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note
19, at 149 (“The immediate outcome of the exercise of a virtue is a choice which issues in right
action.”).
185. See Feldman, supra note 35, at 61; see also Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22,
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different virtuous decision makers might choose quite different means
to achieve the same end.186 An important benefit of the virtue
jurisprudential framework is that it forces decision makers to recognize
that trade-offs between and among people will likely be necessary. As
such, there is not necessarily a “best means” to adopt, just as there is not
a single outcome to be achieved. Instead, there are a variety of
solutions that a court might employ, each with its own benefits and
drawbacks for particular parties-in-interest. Virtue jurisprudential
theories highlight this fact and explicitly encourage the open and full
consideration of both means and ends.
The Bankruptcy Code also encourages the explicit consideration of
both methods and outcomes.187 These Code provisions require a
decision maker to consider both: (i) the ends to be achieved; and (ii) the
best way to achieve those ends. They commonly do so by giving
discretion to the bankruptcy judge to grant relief if “cause” exists.188
“Cause” is rarely defined by the Bankruptcy Code. As such, these
provisions require bankruptcy judges to consider what standards are
relevant to its determination and how to apply those standards to the
facts of a particular case.
For example, section 1104(a) allows a bankruptcy court to appoint a
trustee to manage the debtor’s estate if the court determines that
cause189 exists or because appointment “is in the interests of creditors,
any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate.”190
However, the Code does not explain how judges should evaluate the
interests of creditors, equity security holders, or the vague notion of
“other interests of the estate.” Complicating matters further, section
1104(c) provides that if the court declines to appoint a trustee, it “shall

at 717 (discussing the interrelationship of means and ends). Virtue ethics’ unique focus on both
the ends to be achieved and the appropriate means to achieve those ends sets virtue ethics apart
from deontology and consequentialism. See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 732
(“[U]nlike consequentialism and deontology, [virtue] theory has an analytical focus on both the
means and ends of law.”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 149 (discussing virtue theory’s
focus on means and ends); supra notes 118, 180.
186. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 149 (“[A] number of quite different means may be
employed to achieve one and the same end.”).
187. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012); id. § 107(c)(1); id. § 303; id. § 324; id. § 349; id. §
350; id. § 362; id. § 363; id. § 365; id. § 502; id. § 503; id. § 1104; id. § 1112; id. § 1113; id. §
1114; id. § 1121; id. § 1129.
188. See, e.g., id. § 105; id. § 107(c)(1); id. § 303.
189. Somewhat unusually, § 1104 defines cause. Id. § 1104(a)(1) defines cause to include
“fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current
management, either before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause.” See id. §
1104(a)(1).
190. Id. § 1104(a)(2).
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order the appointment of an examiner . . . if such appointment is in the
interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of
the estate . . . .”191 In other words, if a court determines that
appointment of a trustee is not in the interests of parties to the case, the
Code explicitly contemplates that the court might still find that
appointment of an examiner is in the interests of those parties. But it
does not instruct the courts on how to make these determinations. It
does not explain how courts should evaluate the interests of the parties,
whether appointment of an examiner or trustee better serves those
interests, or how to compare potentially conflicting benefits and burdens
on the parties.
Although the Code does not explain the circumstances under which
bankruptcy judges should appoint an examiner rather than a trustee, it
does provide a process for reaching that decision. The process set forth
in the Code requires judges to consider the various interests of creditors,
equity security holders, and other interest holders (the ends) and
whether appointment of a trustee or an examiner is the best way to
achieve those ends (the means). This means-ends analysis is the correct
process to follow, but this process does not dictate a “correct” outcome.
Instead, a “correct” outcome is reached by following this particular
process. Similarly, virtue jurisprudence suggests that a “correct”
decision is the decision made by a virtuous decision maker who
engaged in a virtue-centered decision process.192
IV. VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE BETTER EXPLAINS SOME OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE’S MOST SALIENT FEATURES
Virtue jurisprudence is a theory that helps to explain both bankruptcy
law’s broad policy objectives and its specific content. The three
examples that follow are areas of corporate bankruptcy law and policy
191. In full, § 1104(c) provides:
If the court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section, then at any
time before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United
States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of
an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate, including
an investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct,
mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor of or by
current or former management of the debtor, if—
(1) such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and
other interests of the estate; or
(2) the debtor’s fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services,
or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000.
Id. § 1104(c).
192. This requires a context-specific, deliberative evaluation. See Feldman, supra note 35, at
59 (discussing practical wisdom).
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that virtue jurisprudence helps explain and that other theories have
failed to explain (or have failed to even attempt to explain). Virtue
jurisprudence is better situated to explain these aspects of corporate
bankruptcy law because it provides a decision-making framework that
accounts for bankruptcy courts’ equitable and discretionary powers, and
because it accounts for bankruptcy law’s focus on virtues other than
efficiency.
A. Virtue Jurisprudence Explains Chapter 11’s Focus on Job
Preservation
One of Chapter 11’s primary purposes is to preserve jobs.193 Chapter
11 is most commonly associated with the reorganization of struggling
business, and reorganization is usually thought to be job preserving. As
a result, these two ends—reorganization and job preservation—are
closely related (if not wholly distinct), and Congress 194 and the
courts195 have clearly stated that job preservation is one of Chapter 11’s
most important goals. A number of creditors’ bargain theorists do not
recognize that job preservation is an important goal that can be achieved
through our bankruptcy system,196 and even those who acknowledge
that preserving jobs is important often deny that the bankruptcy system
is the appropriate forum to deal with such issues.197
These theorists generally claim that if bankruptcy law favors noncontractual counterparties (e.g., employees) at the expense of
193. See 123 CONG. REC. 35,444 (1977) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (“For businesses, the bill
facilitates reorganizations, protecting investments, and jobs.”); see also Jonathan C. Lipson, The
Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 1614 (2009) (noting that Chapter 11’s
“overarching policy goal is to preserve going concerns and jobs”); Chrystin Ondersma,
Employment Patterns in Relation to Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 237, 239 (2009) (noting
that failures in Chapter 11 can affect millions of employees); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197,
1210 (2005) [hereinafter Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy] (estimating that,
in 1994, approximately two million jobs were at risk in business bankruptcies, although this
included consumer bankruptcy cases).
194. See 123 CONG. REC. 35,444 (1977) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
195. See, e.g., In re Motors Liquidation Co., 430 B.R. 65, 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting
the “substantial public interest” in preserving jobs (citing In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No.
01-00056, 2001 WL 1820326, at *14 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001))); see also GROSS, supra note
13, at 224 (asserting that “the interests of workers were considered sufficiently important [and
were] to be treated specially”).
196. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 15, at 25 n.8.
197. See Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 87 (1995) (“Attempting to save jobs through
an inefficient bankruptcy regime may therefore have the opposite of its intended effect.”); see
also Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 185
(1987) (“[I]t seems strange to worry about problems like those of former workers in bankruptcy
and not elsewhere.”).
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contractual claimants (e.g., lenders), then the debtor’s contractual
counterparties will, ex ante, raise the cost of credit.198 More expensive
credit will decrease overall economic activity, which will, in turn, lead
to less job creation. Thus, bankruptcy laws that focus on preserving
jobs in specific instances will have the unintended consequence of
decreasing overall employment in the economy.199
In some ways, the creditors’ bargain theorists are expressing a
concern with fairness when they make such arguments. In business,
fairness requires “a certain kind of ‘attunement,’ a sense of value and a
willingness to exchange value for value,” even in the absence of
objective guideposts.200 Mutual agreement may be one of the only
objective market signals to suggest that a bargain was fair. 201 As such,
it is possible to conceive of the creditors’ bargain theorists’ focus on
preserving ex ante contractual entitlements as an attempt to ensure
fairness for a debtor’s contractual counterparties. But it is a limited
concern with fairness, one that is restricted to ensuring the fair treatment
of a debtor’s contractual counterparties.
The creditors’ bargain theorists’ exclusive focus on ensuring the fair
198. See Rasmussen, Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 70, at 13–14 (“When a bankruptcy
regime protects certain persons who have dealt with a bankrupt firm, this protection may come at
the expense of others in society who would have obtained jobs but for the rise in interest rates
caused by the bankruptcy regime.”); see also Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the
1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1987) (“These losses raise the
cost of risk taking and cause lenders to reduce their willingness to make loans to consumers
generally.”); Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW.
U. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2005) (“[T]he option of bankruptcy created a moral hazard problem and
increases the risk associated with consumer lending . . . .”); cf. Joshua Goodman & Adam Levitin,
Bankruptcy Law and the Cost of Credit: The Impact of Cramdown on Mortgage Interest Rates 14
(Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research, Working Paper No. RWP12-037 2012), available at
http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/9403179 (arguing that cramdown raises the cost of credit for
some borrowers by ten to twenty basis points, but those same borrowers benefit from a sort of
public insurance in the form of bankruptcy protection). But see Carlson, supra note 63, at 616–17
(contesting the claims that additional bankruptcy entitlements increase the cost of credit for
“good” companies); but see also Feibelman, supra note 9, at 168 n.216 (noting that “the effect of
a prior bankruptcy in an individual’s ability to obtain credit is not well understood”); Warren &
Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy, supra note 193, at 1222 (arguing that many creditors
will not raise the cost of credit because they are mal- or non-adjusting creditors); Zhang, supra
note 54, at 6 (same).
199. See Rasmussen & Skeel, Jr., supra note 197, at 87; see also Aghion, Improving
Bankruptcy, supra note 14, at 852 n.7 (suggesting that a general employment subsidy would be
preferable to saving jobs by using the bankruptcy system). But see Warren & Westbrook,
Contracting Out of Bankruptcy, supra note 193, at 1215 (arguing that alternatives to Chapter 11
have substantial inefficiencies that may swamp any purported efficiencies from change).
200. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 210.
201. See Coleman, supra note 57, at 516 (“Exchanges among knowledgeable, rational persons
in a free market are generally Pareto superior; rational individuals do not strike bargains with one
another unless each perceives it to be in his or her own interest to do so.”).
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treatment of a debtor’s contractual counterparties excludes
considerations of fairness for non-contractual counterparties, such as
employees, tort victims, and taxing authorities.202 Nevertheless, if it
were demonstrably true that Chapter 11’s focus on preserving jobs in
specific instances decreased the overall number of jobs in the economy,
it would be reasonable to reconsider Chapter 11’s focus on job
preservation.203 However, the available empirical evidence does not
clearly support the conclusions of the creditors’ bargain theorists.204
But it does suggest that the arguments commonly made about why
Chapter 11 should not focus on preserving jobs may be overly
simplistic.205 And even if protecting jobs did raise the cost of
commercial credit, it is far from clear that these costs are not offset by
an increase in social welfare that may result because jobs are saved and
human flourishing increased.206 For example, Joshua Goodman and
Adam Levitin have suggested that small increases in the cost of credit
that result from the existence of cramdown may be efficiency enhancing
because cramdown creates a form of insurance that the market does not
otherwise provide.207 In addition, the creditors’ bargain theory ignores

202. See Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy, supra note 193, at 1220
(defining involuntary creditors as having “no contractual relationship with the debtor”); see also
Lucien Arye Bebchuk & Jess M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 908 (1996) (identifying four categories of nonadjusting creditors:
(i) involuntary creditors, such as tort claimants; (ii) small claim holders, such as customers,
employees and trade creditors; (iii) taxing authorities and government regulatory claimholders;
and (iv) creditors who have extended credit on fixed terms).
203. In any case, it would still be useful to consider why Congress prioritized preserving jobs
when it enacted Chapter 11.
204. See Feibelman, supra note 9, at 168 n.216 (noting that “the effect of a prior bankruptcy
in an individual’s ability to obtain credit is not well understood”); see also Jean Braucher,
Bankruptcy Reorganization and Economic Development, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 499, 505 (1994)
(“The arm-chair empiricism of the law and economics school, driven by free market ideology, is
bound to be error-ridden.”); Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & James B. Thomson, Stripdowns and
Bankruptcy: Lessons from Agricultural Bankruptcy Reform, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
CLEVELAND (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/20109.cfm. But see Goodman & Levitin, supra note 198, at 2 (discussing the impact of cramdown on
mortgage interest rates).
205. See Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 527–28 (arguing that “claims that bankruptcy law
should have no goal other than to minimize the cost of debt capital . . . exaggerate[] the absence
of socially beneficial effects for bankruptcy provisions that protect specific creditor groups”).
206. See Warren, Untenable Case, supra note 14, at 467 (arguing that bankruptcy’s
redistributive goals are “sufficiently important to justify slight inefficiencies”); see also GROSS,
supra note 13, at 129 (presenting arguments in favor of curtailing creditor’s ex ante rights in
favor of debtor rehabilitation); Russell Hardin, The Morality of Law and Economics, in LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY 331, 360 (11th ed. 1992) (noting that “we might have to give up some efficiency for
other gains”).
207. See Goodman & Levitin, supra note 198, at 15 (finding that the availability of cramdown
raised interest rates on certain debtors by 1–2% per month, but noting that this might be
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that human flourishing is person-specific and that maximizing aggregate
welfare may have unacceptable distributional outcomes.208 Congress
may fairly have chosen to tolerate some level of aggregate inefficiency
in an attempt to preserve jobs and create acceptable distributional
outcomes, because human flourishing is person-specific.209
There are at least three other concerns that could have informed
Congress’ decision to orient Chapter 11 towards job preservation,
concerns that a virtue jurisprudential understanding of bankruptcy law
can help to explain. First, virtue jurisprudence recognizes that the loss
of jobs can be more than just a side effect of closing a business: it can
mean the loss of dignity for workers.210 Second, shuttered businesses
eliminate jobs, jobs that might be critical to a particular community.
Communities that developed around one large employer can be easily
decimated if that employer closes its doors and unemployed workers
move on in search of other work, or seek relief in alcohol or
narcotics.211 Third, virtue jurisprudence recognizes that the “losses
flowing from the failure of a business are never completely absorbed by
the parties who voluntarily elect to make an economic investment in the
debtor-business.”212 In part, this is because employees tend to be poor
risk-spreaders because they can usually have only one job at a time.213
These examples illustrate some of the social costs of business failure
“efficiency-enhancing by creating a form of insurance that the private market does not provide”).
But see Feibelman, supra note 9, at 160 (contending that “bankruptcy serves the same social
insurance functions” as many other common forms of insurance and suggesting that these other
forms may be better vehicles for providing social insurance).
208. See Zhang, supra note 54, at 52–53 (arguing that it is an “uncomfortable fact that secured
lending is a double-edge sword: it may benefit our society as a whole, but only if some of its
members suffer a loss; it improves our well-being sometimes, but causes damage at others”).
209. See Warren, Untenable Case, supra note 14, at 467; see also GROSS, supra note 13, at
138 (arguing that “[b]ankruptcy involves much more than maximizing creditors’ recovery”);
Hardin, supra note 206, at 360 (recognizing that a degree of efficiency may need to be sacrificed
in favor of other interests).
210. See Martin, supra note 48, at 482 (recognizing that “job displacement has high social
costs”); see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 119 (discussing the role of dignity and self-respect in
the bankruptcy context); cf. Rasmussen, Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 70, at 35–36 (suggesting
that overall dignity among workers is increased when the overall number of jobs is maximized
because “a person’s self-respect stemming from employment” may increase with time).
211. See Martin, supra note 48, at 474 (discussing the “moral upheaval of losing a
community” through job loss, which can eliminate or at least damage the links among people);
see also Feibelman, supra note 9, at 166 (noting the hard to measure but still important
“intangible costs, especially emotional costs” associated with financial collapse).
212. Ponoroff, supra note 76, at 495; see also Ondersma, supra note 193, at 248 (noting that
workers develop job-specific skills that cannot be easily redeployed elsewhere).
213. See Zhang, supra note 54, at 8 (arguing that employees cannot mitigate risk through
diversification); see also Ondersma, supra note 193, at 248 (noting that workers typically gain
skills particular to only a certain job).
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that a virtue jurisprudential understanding of bankruptcy requires judges
to engage with. Virtue jurisprudence suggests that it is reasonable to
consider whether shareholders and creditors are better situated to bear
the costs of business closures than employees and their communities.214
Virtue jurisprudence’s engagement with such concerns allows it to
make sense of a focus on job preservation, even if it comes at the
expense of some aggregate inefficiency.
However, it may be the case that preserving jobs is economically
efficient, but that the non-economic benefits are simply hard to
measure.215 Congress’ acknowledgement that preserving jobs has
independent value might be seen as building a bias into Chapter 11
toward a hard-to-measure end because of the likelihood of systemic
undervaluation by efficiency-minded judges.216 For example, many
employees make firm-specific investments expecting to share in the
rents and surpluses of a business, despite failing to protect those
investments through “direct contracting, personal trust, or
reputation.”217 In such cases, it would be inefficient (not to mention
inequitable) to deny employees protections equal to or greater than
those enjoyed by other creditors because the business should be viewed
as a joint enterprise created through the owner’s assets and the workers’
labor.218 In this way, Chapter 11’s focus on job preservation might be
viewed simply as taking a wider view of the efficiency rationale for
bankruptcy and attempting to ensure that bankruptcy law maximizes the
wealth of all parties affected by financial distress and not just

214. Employees, communities and others are usually deeply invested and may be affected
deeply or even disastrously by business failure. They are rarely just disinterested spectators. See
SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 122.
215. See GROSS, supra note 13, at 199 (noting that noneconomic values are “not always
measured in traditional economic terms”); see also Feibelman, supra note 9, at 166 (noting that
self-insurance costs are difficult to evaluate).
216. To be certain, the Code’s protection for parties without formal legal rights (non-creditor
interests) are derivative in nature and limited in scope, but they certainly exist. See Warren,
Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 14, at 355 (“The Code accounts for the rights of other
parties that a business failure affects by giving a failing company an opportunity to sell itself . . .
in chapter 7 or to reorganize in chapter 11.”); see also Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 14,
at 787 (“The bankruptcy system goes so far as to anticipate the consequences of default on a host
of potential creditors, including . . . future tort claimants who have not yet discovered their
injuries or their legal rights . . . .”).
217. LoPucki, Team Production Theory, supra note 18, at 749; see also Francisco Cabrillo &
Ben W.F. Depoorter, Bankruptcy Proceedings, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 261,
272 (Edward Elgar & The University of Ghent eds., 1999) (noting that employees may “also
expect the right to a part of the company assets as indemnity for the loss of their jobs”).
218. See Martin, supra note 48, at 483 (noting that a joint enterprise is created through the
owner’s assets and the workers’ labor (citing Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1998))).
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creditors.219
There are costs to closing down businesses, dislocating workers, and
disrupting communities.220 Virtue jurisprudence encourages judges to
fully consider these costs, whereas the creditors’ bargain model casts
these costs as mere externalities.221 Virtue jurisprudence explains
Chapter 11’s focus on job preservation because it understands human
lives can be path-determinative and that human flourishing might be
harmed by actions taken by debtors or their creditors.222 Even
assuming that closing down a business and selling off its pieces
increases aggregate welfare, it is likely to hinder the ability of some
citizens to flourish in the short-term.223 And it can short-circuit “longterm plans, deeply held commitments, and carefully constructed
identities.”224 This has a measurable cost, but only a theory that
recognizes that human flourishing is a phenomenon of actual, living
human beings,225 and that there is an “organic integrity and coherence
to its individual experience that resists disassembly and substitution”226
can fully account for these costs. Virtue jurisprudence does so. By

219. See Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 119–20 (“[I]f maximizing social
wealth is the ultimate ideal, then it becomes unclear why the principle of bankruptcy law should
be to maximize only the wealth of creditors, rather than all parties affected by financial distress.”
(emphasis in original)); see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 224 (arguing that § 1113 (relating to
collective bargaining agreements) essentially forced courts “to take the interests of the
community into account”); Martin, supra note 48, at 492 (rejecting the notion that non-creditor
interests cannot be quantified).
220. See Martin, supra note 48, at 474 n.202 (discussing the “moral upheaval of losing a
community” through job loss, which can eliminate or at least damage the links among people).
“Meaningful life work is necessary on a large scale for the long-term sustainability of meaningful
human existence.” Id. at 476; cf. Penalver, supra note 57, at 871 (discussing three goals that can
be accomplished by laws that override private decisions and command land owners to “act in
accordance with virtue”).
221. This blindness to the human costs of our bankruptcy policies may be a result of the use of
a unitary metric of valuation, which ignores the possibility of qualitatively distinct valuations.
See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 783–84; see also In re After Six, Inc., 154
B.R. 876, 883 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (indicating the court was “appalled” at the failure to
consider the debtor’s former employees employment prospects as a relevant factor in choosing a
successful bid for the debtor’s assets).
222. “Meaningful life work is necessary on a large scale for the long-term sustainability of
meaningful human existence.” Martin, supra note 48, at 476; see also Penalver, supra note 57, at
871.
223. See Feibelman, supra note 9, at 166 (noting the negative effects of financial collapse on
individuals). But see Rasmussen, Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 70, at 35–36 (arguing that “the
longer one holds a job, the more one can prepare for the dislocations which occur if the job is
lost”).
224. Penalver, supra note 57, at 881; see also Martin, supra note 48, at 483 n.237 (noting
scholars who focus on the concerns of workers).
225. Penalver, supra note 57, at 881.
226. Id.
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contrast, the creditors’ bargain model treats humans as possessors of
welfare, ready to be maximized, but argues—curiously—that
bankruptcy is not the mechanism by which to promote human
flourishing.
Recognizing that job displacement wastes human capital does not
mean that jobs are always preserved, no matter the cost. That is neither
sensible, nor what the Code or virtue jurisprudence requires. The extent
to which jobs should be protected depends on various factors, such as
the harm faced by the laid-off employees (and their families and
communities), the employees’ ability to protect themselves, and the
potential harm to creditors and other parties. It may often be the case
that after balancing all of the competing values at stake, the business is
liquidated anyway and jobs are lost. But focusing on Chapter 11’s jobs
purpose may help to avoid particularly severe harms to employees, their
dependents, and their communities, and ensures that harm to laid-off
workers is fully considered.227 Only virtue jurisprudence addresses and
accounts for Chapter 11’s focus on job preservation; the creditors’
bargain does not.
B. Virtue Jurisprudence Explains Chapter 11’s Reorganization Bias
Chapter 11 is biased toward the rehabilitation of financially
distressed companies and their reorganization into viable, going
concerns.228 The Supreme Court has stated that the Bankruptcy Code’s
“fundamental purpose . . . is to prevent a debtor from going into
liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of
economic resources.”229 This purpose is also clearly evident from the
227. See Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 105 (discussing bankruptcy law’s
jobs purpose); see also Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 857.
228. See 123 CONG. REC. 35,444 (1977) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (“For businesses, the bill
facilitates reorganizations, protecting investments, and jobs.”); see also LYNN M. LOPUCKI,
COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY
COURTS 184 (2005) (noting that in “the United States, managers have the option or reorganizing
the firm”); Martin, supra note 48, at 436 n.26 (“[A]s long as rehabilitation is possible, it is clearly
preferable to liquidation.”); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47
B.C. L. REV. 129, 143 (2005) (noting that the “1978 Act was designed to provide ‘bankrupt
businesses another opportunity to survive’” (citation omitted)); David Hahn, Concentrated
Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganizations 2 (Bar-llan Univ. Working Paper No. 6-03,
2003), available at http://www.biu.ac.il/law/unger/wk_papers.html (noting that in the United
States, “financially ailing firms turn to reorganization and file a bankruptcy petition under
Chapter 11”).
229. NLRB. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 9505925,
at 200 (1977)); see also In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(noting that the “paramount policy and goal of Chapter 11, to which all other bankruptcy policies
are subordinated, is the rehabilitation of the debtor”); GROSS, supra note 13, at 138 (“Bankruptcy
involves much more than maximizing creditors’ recovery as measured in dollars and cents.”).
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Code itself. Some of the Bankruptcy Code provisions that foster the
rehabilitation of debtors include: (i) the automatic stay of most actions
against the debtor, its properties, and properties in the possession of the
debtor upon commencement of a Chapter 11 case;230 (ii) the debtor’s
broad authority to obtain post-petition financing;231 (iii) the authority to
reject unfavorable executory contracts;232 (iv) an expansive definition of
“property of the estate”;233 (v) broad powers to recover property of the
estate removed from the debtor’s possession in the months and years
leading up to the commencement of a Chapter 11 case;234 and (vi) the
debtor’s broad powers to administer its bankruptcy case, including the
exclusive right to file a proposed plan of reorganization.235
Chapter 11’s reorganization bias has puzzled some theorists who
subscribe to the creditors’ bargain model.236 These theorists suggest
that when the residual owners of a firm would prefer an outright sale of
the firm to the highest bidder, allowing a company to be reorganized is
inappropriate.237 These theorists assume that if the firm’s residual
owners prefer liquidation, then liquidation would maximize the
economic value of the firm.238 They frequently suggest that Chapter 11
is flawed because it allows existing management to seek to reorganize
the company even when reorganization is not value maximizing for the
residual owners.239
230. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
231. Id. § 364.
232. Id. § 365.
233. Id. § 541.
234. Id. §§ 542–550; see, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 674 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.
1982) (holding that a Chapter 11 debtor can require the Internal Revenue Service to turn over
tangible property seized by it), aff’d, 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
235. 11 U.S.C. §1121.
236. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127, 128 (1986) (“[T]he entire law of corporate reorganizations is hard to justify under any
set of facts and virtually impossible when the debtor is a publicly held corporation.”); see also
Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 489 (1992)
[hereinafter Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk] (asserting that “there is no need for bankruptcy
reorganization, which serves no purpose other than reorganization”); Aghion, Economics of
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 14, at 529 (“We believe that there are serious theoretical and
practical problems with Chapter 11.”); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1050–52
(advocating the repeal of Chapter 11); Jackson, supra note 14, at 894 (“Reorganization
proceedings provide nothing more than a method by which the sale of an enterprise as a going
concern may be made to the creditors themselves.”); Hahn, supra note 228, at 2 (noting the
“continuous questioning” of reorganization under Chapter 11 by commentators).
237. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 236, at 145.
238. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 228, at 28–29; see also Woo, supra note 53, at 1618, 1623
(noting the “standard assumption of value maximization”).
239. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 228, at 29; see also Aghion, Economics of Bankruptcy
Reform, supra note 14, at 529 (“Chapter 11 mixes two decisions together: the decision of who
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Creditors’ bargain theorists commonly offer two explanations for
why management would seek to reorganize a company when its
creditors (normally its secured creditors) believe that liquidation would
be value maximizing. One claim is that existing management may be
attempting to keep their jobs, if even for only a short time, by choosing
to reorganize.240
Because these (managerial) job-preserving
reorganization attempts are said to come at the expense of the residual
owners,241 many have called for the repeal of Chapter 11’s
reorganization provisions.242
Another persistent claim is that Chapter 11’s reorganization
provisions encourage shareholders of financially distressed firms to
make inefficient production and investment decisions. 243 Specifically,
they encourage shareholders to “underinvest” in positive net value
projects and “overinvest” in high-risk/large-return projects.244 The

should get what . . . and the decision of what should be done with the firm.”); Bradley &
Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1050–52 (arguing that Chapter 11 exclusively serves the interests
of incumbent management to the detriment of all security holders). But see LoPucki,
Reorganization Realities, supra note 61, at 1307 (suggesting that the work of the creditors’
bargain theorists is unrealistic); but see also Tabb, supra note 17, at 808 (rejecting the notion that
Chapter 11 should be repealed).
240. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1050–52; see also Aghion,
Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 14, at 529 (noting that management may desire to
“tilt the outcome of the bargaining toward reorganization (and the retention of their jobs)”); Alan
Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1824–25
(1998) (noting that the firm “prefers the bankruptcy system that permits it to consume the most
private benefits”). But see Woo, supra note 53, at 1661 (asserting that bank regulation can
explain decisions to pursue liquidation even when reorganization would be value maximizing);
see also Ponoroff, supra note 76, at 484 (noting that “empirical evidence reveals that more often
than not the first thing to occur in public company reorganizations is the removal and replacement
of old management”); Tabb, supra note 17, at 858 (same).
241. The creditors’ bargain theorists’ assertion that reorganizations come at the expense of the
residual owners is premised on the assumption that the residual owners will always seek to
maximize the value of their assets. See Woo, supra note 53, at 1616. This assumption has been
severely critiqued, and is, at best, unreliable. See id. at 1617 (asserting that bank regulation can
explain decisions to pursue liquidation even when reorganization would be value maximizing).
242. An illustrative list of such writings include: Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk, supra note 236,
at 489; Baird, supra note 236, at 128; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1043; and
Jackson, supra note 14, at 223.
243. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1052–53. But see George G. Triantis,
A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 920
(1993) (suggesting that bankruptcy courts exercise judicial supervision to ensure value
maximizing investment decisions).
244. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1053; see also Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334–37 (1976) (discussing the incentive effects associated with
debt); Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 155 (1977)
(noting that the existence of corporate debt can “reduce the present market value of the firm by
weakening the corporation’s incentive to undertake good future investments”); David A. Skeel,
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alleged reason for these inefficient investments is that the minimal
returns yielded by low-risk projects will be devoted largely to paying
down debt obligations and that only high-risk projects offer any hope of
providing a return to shareholders of a financially distressed
company.245
Neither explanation appears to capture why Congress has favored
reorganization. This is unsurprising because both of these claims
depend on unreliable assumptions246 and limited empirical evidence.247
Such evidence that does exist does not appear to support the creditors’
bargain theorists’ claims.248 The economic analysis of law does not
seem to be able to explain Chapter 11’s reorganization bias and so it has
limited itself to critiquing Congress for having favored reorganization.
But since the creditors’ bargain theorists’ normative conclusions are
premised on shaky foundations, alternative explanations may be well-

Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
917, 935 (2003) (discussing the risk of overinvestment).
245. See Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate Reorganization: A
Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REV. 669, 708 (1993) [hereinafter Korobkin,
Unwarranted Case] (“Economists observe that, in a capital structure with risky debt, shareholders
may have incentives to reach investment and production decisions that are inefficient from the
perspective of maximizing firm value.”); see also Zhang, supra note 54, at 65–67 (discussing the
underinvestment problem).
246. See, e.g., Woo, supra note 53, at 1661 (asserting that bank regulation can explain
decision to pursue liquidation even when reorganization would be value maximizing).
247. The most common explanation for a managerial preference for non-value maximizing
reorganizations is that it allows existing management to keep their jobs, if even for only a short
time. However, empirical evidence suggests that senior managers usually suffer a loss of their
jobs shortly before or soon after entering Chapter 11. See, e.g., Ponoroff, supra note 76, at 484
(noting that “empirical evidence reveals that more often than not the first thing to occur in public
company reorganizations is the removal and replacement of old management”); see also Lois
LoPucki & William Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly-Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 685 (1993) (same); LoPucki,
Reorganization Realities, supra note 61, at 1313 (same); Ondersma, supra note 193, at 247
(same); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Search for Hercules: Residual Owners, Directors, and
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1445, 1448 (2004) (same).
248. Evidence suggests that the efficiency effects of reorganization are ambiguous. Robert
Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J.
FIN. 1189, 1209 (1991); see also Arturo Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7
Liquidation vs. Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1269 (2006) (studying almost 300
corporate bankruptcy cases from Arizona and New York filed between 1995 and 2001 and
concluding that reorganization appears to preserve asset values better than liquidations); Stuart C.
Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate
Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1990) (suggesting “that
corporate default engenders significant changes in the ownership of firms’ residual claims and in
the allocation of rights to manage corporate resources”); Korobkin, Unwarranted Case, supra
note 245, at 708–11 (providing a detailed discussion of Gertner and Sharfstein’s work as it relates
to this claim); Skeel, Jr., supra note 244, at 935 n.66 (discussing empirical evidence suggesting
that the underinvestment/overinvestment problem is something of a red herring).
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taken.
By contrast, virtue jurisprudence is able to offer a positive
explanation for Chapter 11’s reorganization bias.249 Unlike the
creditors’ bargain and its narrow focus on economic efficiency, virtue
jurisprudence simultaneously focuses on promoting multiple virtues and
choosing the right means to do so. Whereas the economic analysis of
law tends only to focus on bankruptcy law’s effect on contractual
counterparties,250 virtue jurisprudence considers the laws’ effects on
both contractual and non-contractual counterparties.251
When
bankruptcy judges are called on to evaluate non-monetary interests,
such as the interests of the local community, they may believe that they
lack an adequate medium to compare these interests with potentially
competing economic concerns.252 Although nothing inherent in
economic theory forecloses consideration of non-contractual interests,
non-contractual interests regularly receive short shrift in approaches
based on economic theory.253
Chapter 11’s reorganization bias can be viewed as an
acknowledgement that it is difficult to make precise ex ante predictions
about the efficiency of various economic arrangements, and that
decision makers tend to elide hard-to-quantify costs or benefits.254
These valuable, but difficult to quantify ends include “maintaining
249. It is certainly true that if “welfare” were given a sufficiently capacious definition, the
economic analysis of law might also be able to explain Chapter 11’s reorganization bias. The
point of this Article is not to suggest that virtue ethics is the only theory that can explain
bankruptcy law, but that it does a better job than the existing theories. This Article does suggest,
however, that the creditors’ bargain theory gives short shrift to non-economic stakeholders and
non-creditor interests.
250. See James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy’s Law:
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097, 2143
(1990) (noting that the common-pool analysis “is premised on the unspoken assumption that if
the market value of the debtor’s estate is maximized everything will be hunky dory”); Martin,
supra note 48, at 437 n.31 (noting that law and economics scholars typically ignore concerns
about community interests).
251. Bankruptcy may also be conceived as prioritizing future economic growth over shortterm economic gains. See GROSS, supra note 13, at 138 (“Bankruptcy is concerned with
rehabilitating debtors, which may not benefit creditors’ short term recovery.”).
252. Cf. Hon. Barry S. Schermer, Response to Professor Gross: Taking the Interests of the
Community into Account in Bankruptcy—A Modern-Day Tale of Belling the Cat, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1049, 1051 (1994) (discussing problems with adequately considering community interest).
253. See James W. Bowers, Wither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy’s Law, Bankruptcy Theory,
and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 37 (1991) (discussing
contractual interests).
254. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 228, at 144 (“Such provisions reflected Congress’
intent to balance the interests of all parties involved in the Chapter 11 reorganization process.”);
see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 195, 199, 208 (taking the view that certain societal goods
cannot be measured in economic terms).
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employment, preserving the local tax base, and advancing community
stability.”255 Virtue jurisprudence can account for the need to consider
each of these goals because of the means-ends symbiosis. In addition,
practical wisdom provides a method for reconciling the competing
demands of corporate bankruptcies. Through the use of practical
wisdom and by simultaneously considering means and ends, a virtue
jurisprudential account can provide appropriate consideration of
contractual and non-contractual interests. Chapter 11’s reorganization
bias can be seen as an attempt to preserve the positive externalities of
reorganization despite the difficulty in balancing competing, and
perhaps inconsistent, goals.256
C. Virtue Jurisprudence Explains Chapter 11’s Examiner Provisions
Individual preferences are not exogenous; human beings have some
control over shaping their own preferences.257 The endogeneity of
human preferences leaves room for the law to actively educate citizens
in virtue.258 Aristotle believed that one of the law’s central roles was to
encourage a virtuous citizenry.259 But he believed that the law should
do more to encourage virtue than merely prohibiting certain actions
with the hope that citizens will avoid those actions out of fear of
punishment.260 As previously discussed, the virtuousness of action is
not judged by compliance with some set of pre-existing rules.261
255. Warren & Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11, supra note 57, at 625; see also 123
CONG. REC. 35,444 (1977) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (“For businesses, the bill facilitates
reorganizations, protecting investments, and jobs.”); In re Motors Liquidation, 430 B.R. 65, 84
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting the ‘“substantial public interest in preserving the value of TWA
as a going concern”’ (citing In re Trans World Airlines, No. 01-00056, 2001 WL 1820326, at *14
(Bankr. D. Del. 2001)); GROSS, supra note 13, at 195; Butler & Gilpatric, supra note 15 at 282–
83 (arguing that law and economics undervalues non-contractual relationships); Martin, supra
note 48, at 437 n.31 (noting that law and economics scholars typically ignore concerns about
community interests); Tabb, supra note 17, at 804 (noting the relevance of community interests).
256. See Martin, supra note 48, at 445 (discussing the consideration of “general societal
interests”).
257. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 355 (“Though apparently there are many ends, we
choose some of them . . . .”); see also Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations, supra note 57, at 1207–08
(noting that “we have some control over the shaping of our tastes”).
258. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 822 (noting the “effects of law on
social attitudes”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 154 (noting that some virtues can be
acquired through teaching).
259. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 348 (asserting that happiness should be acquired for
people and cities through virtue); see also Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 715
(“Aristotle believed the most proper and central role of government was to make its citizens
virtuous.”).
260. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 445–47 (discussing moral education).
261. Penalver, supra note 57, at 865; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 153 (asserting
that “[t]he solution is the result of rough and ready reasoning” rather than the “application of a
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Therefore, to help citizens become virtuous, the law should provide a
framework that supports and encourages good decision making by
citizens.262
One way of educating citizens and developing a supportive
framework for their virtuous development is by showcasing examples of
both virtuous and non-virtuous action.263 The Bankruptcy Code
provisions regarding examiners can be seen as one way that bankruptcy
law works to instill virtue in citizens.264 An examiner is an individual
appointed in a bankruptcy case to perform certain specified duties,
including investigating “the acts, conducts, assets, liabilities, and
financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business
and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other
matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan.”265 In short,
examiners can help root out malfeasance, and also help parties-ininterest decide whether a business can be successfully reorganized.266
By exposing prior instances where parties have acted inappropriately
and criticizing those actions, the Code’s examiner provisions can help
teach future actors to make virtuous decisions.267 This is not about
punishment; examiners who ferret out past wrongful actions do not
prosecute those who have acted wrongfully. 268
Instead, the

rule”).
262. Laws “cannot compel people to realize moral goods. . . . Their contribution to making
men moral must be indirect.” Robert P. George, The Central Tradition—Its Value and Limits, in
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 35, at 1, 45.
263. See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 731 (noting the state’s obligation to
educate its citizens in virtue).
264. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012), which provides, in relevant part:
[A]t any time before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the
United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the
appointment of an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is
appropriate, including an investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the
affairs of the debtor of or by current or former management of the debtor, if—(1) such
appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other
interests of the estate; or (2) the debtor’s fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than
debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000.
265. Id. § 1106(a)(3).
266. Examiners have other purposes as well, such as uncovering potential causes of action for
the estate to pursue. See, e.g., Order Directing Appointment of an Examiner Pursuant to Section
1104(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555, slip op. at
3–5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2009) (ordering an examiner to investigate whether there were any
colorable causes of action arising from the failure of Lehman Brothers).
267. Although it might also be seen as a stick with which to threaten future actors, acting out
of fear of punishment is not virtuous. Virtuous behavior requires taking action for the right
reasons.
268. Typically causes of actions uncovered by examiners are prosecuted, if at all, by the

THE VIRTUE IN BANKRUPTCY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

282

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/17/2013 10:50 AM

[Vol. 45

appointment of examiners can serve to teach the right way to act by
highlighting non-virtuous actions.269
By contrast, the creditors’ bargain model would conceive of the
question of whether to appoint an examiner as an option to be weighed
via cost-benefit analysis. Creditors’ bargain theorists would suggest
that an examiner should not be appointed unless he or she is likely to
uncover enough colorable causes of action such that appointment would
essentially earn the estate a profit. Unfortunately, this view has taken
root in certain courts.270 This view appears to misunderstand both the
history of the examiner provisions271 and the statutory text.272 The
appointment of an examiner is mandatory in cases where the debt
threshold has been met and a party in interest or the United States
Trustee requests appointment.273
The mandatory nature of examiner appointments cannot be explained
through an efficiency analysis, but it can be understood from a virtue
jurisprudential perspective.274 The law can help shape preferences—
and therefore actions.275 Examiners serve to increase human flourishing
by helping to make the many who are not virtuous more so by “shaming
them, habituating, teaching, and then ultimately persuading them.”276
representatives of the unsecured creditors’ committee.
269. The Bankruptcy Code provisions relating to examiners came about as part of a
compromise in which the SEC took a step back from the active role it had under Chapter X of the
Chandler Act. See Lipson, supra note 193, at 1638 n.117; see also Warren, Untenable Case,
supra note 14, at 469. Although the role of the SEC diminished, the appointment of an examiner
was intended to fulfill some of the duties that the SEC had previously played. See Lipson, supra
note 193, at 1627.
270. See, e.g., In re Rutenberg, 158 B.R. 230 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); In re GHR Cos., Inc.,
43 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); In re Shelter Res. Corp., 35 B.R. 304 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1983).
271. See Lipson, supra note 193, at 1627 (noting that Congress created the examiner position
to be, in part, a proxy for the “investigative functions played by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and mandatory trustee under prior law”).
272. See, e.g., Walton v. Cornerstone Ministries Invs., Inc., 398 B.R. 77, 82 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
(noting that the meaning of the statutory text ‘“depends on context”‘ (citation omitted)).
273. See, e.g., In re Revco D.S., Inc. 898 F.2d 498, 501 (6th Cir. 1990); Cornerstone
Ministries Invs., Inc., 398 B.R. at 84; In re Loral Space & Comm., Ltd., No. 04-8645, 2004 WL
2979785, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2004); In re UAL Corp., 307 B.R. 80, 86 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2004); In re Mechem Fin. of Ohio, Inc., 92 B.R. 760, 761 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); In re The
Bible Speaks, 74 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). But see In re Residential Capital, LLC,
474 B.R. 112, 118–20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating, in dicta, that appointment is not
mandatory).
274. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 7 (“[I]f one thinks of business as a ‘dog-eat-dog’ fight
for survival or calculates all business decisions in the limited language of cost/benefit analysis,
unethical behavior is bound to follow.”).
275. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 822 (noting “the effects of law on
social attitudes”).
276. Claeys, supra note 19, at 919–20; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 154
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Being more explicit about enshrining additional obligations to act
virtuously into the law would help to constrain the behavior of nonvirtuous actors, and over time, “teach them to act virtuously of their
own accord.”277
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy law and policy is formed and operated in a world that has
imperfect markets, imperfect information, and significant transaction
costs.278 Chapter 11 reflects these imperfections and messy realities,
but few of the hypothetical bankruptcy models offered up by creditors’
bargain theorists do the same. And yet, creditors’ bargain theorists
often compare their over-simplified, hypothetical bankruptcy models,
such as Chameleon Equity279 or Contingent Equity,280 with our current
system—Chapter 11.281 Based on such comparisons, it is no wonder
that they take the view that Chapter 11 is costly, cumbersome, and in
need of significant reform, if not outright repeal.282 However, while
there is a lot to learn from thought experiments into hypothetical
bankruptcy structures, it is important to extrapolate those conclusions
back into the real world before making policy choices.283
Unfortunately, this crucial, final step is often omitted, impairing our
ability to compare the idealized theories derived from the creditors’
bargain model to our actual bankruptcy laws.284
The creditors’ bargain model seems ill-equipped to account for
Chapter 11’s complexities. By contrast, virtue jurisprudence has the
ability to offer useful insights about under-theorized aspects of

(discussing moral education).
277. Penalver, supra note 57, at 871.
278. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors
Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 81–82 (1992) (criticizing economic analysis for
its assumption of “perfect capital markets and zero transaction costs”).
279. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 14, at 312, 327.
280. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1079.
281. See Butler & Gilpatric, supra note 15, at 277; cf. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 220
(stating that virtue ethics confronts “the darkest dogma of traditional business thinking, the
impoverished idea of Homo economicus who has no attachments or affects other than crude selfinterest and the ability to calculate how to satisfy that interest vis-à-vis other people”).
282. See, e.g., Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk, supra note 236, at 489; Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 14, at 1052–53.
283. See LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, supra note 61, at 1311 (noting that Professor
Adler has referred to Chameleon Equity as a “thought experiment”).
284. See id. (“Most economists are bad at reality; their simplistic models do not begin to
capture phenomenological reality.”); see also Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 14,
at 379 (“We must consider bankruptcy policies in light of their application to cases that arise in
the real world.”).
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bankruptcy law. By focusing on achieving a just result, the bankruptcy
judge can quiet the chaos of financial distress that is often occasioned
by a bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy judge can help prevent creditors
(and debtors) from aiming at cross-purposes because they lack a larger
perspective as to their effects on the enterprise.285
In light of the frailty of human institutions, a consequentialist
approach that seeks to distill every competing claim to a dollar figure
(or some imaginary unit of welfare) and compare such claims on that
basis may be the best way to promote human flourishing. It may be
that, in order to overcome certain institutional weaknesses, we should
resolve disputes by comparing claims according to a unitary metric,
even though this will not reflect a fully adequate understanding of those
claims.286 “[Assuming commensurability] makes things simple and
orderly where they would otherwise be chaotic. In certain areas of the
law, this may be a decisive advantage, all things considered.”287 If this
is the argument that creditors’ bargain theorists wish to make, then they
must make it. Creditors’ bargain theorists must claim that they can do
better than any other system, or they must aim to do less. But it is for
creditors’ bargain theorists to prove that their vision of the world is
practically superior, despite being non-ideal.
Until recently, virtue ethics had more or less fallen out of favor.
Deontological and consequentialist theories ruled the philosophical and
legal academy, and the creditors’ bargain model dominated the
corporate bankruptcy literature.
Virtue ethics was rarely even
mentioned. This seems, in part, because “[b]oth deontological ethics
and utilitarianism stress the importance of broad general principles,
which can then be applied to particular cases.”288 Whereas, it is the
nature of virtue ethics “to start with the particular community and
context and understand cases (and abstract principles) within that
community and context.”289 Similarly, the Code often requires that
bankruptcy judges make context-bound decisions in the exercise of their
discretion.
One of the primary aims of this Article is to introduce virtue ethics
into the corporate bankruptcy literature and to offer it as the right kind
of theory to provide a way to understand the day-to-day dynamics of
285. See Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 18, at 773 (noting that the bankruptcy
process can be constructive for its participants).
286. Cf. Colin Farrelly, Civic Liberalism and Judicial Review, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 35, at 107, 129.
287. Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 853.
288. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 113.
289. Id.; see also Farrelly, supra note 286, at 129.
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bankruptcy law. Virtue ethics is less determinate than the creditorsbargain theory. But the inability to formulate general rules or
prescriptions that can be followed in all situations is a result of virtue
ethics’ recognition that “much depends on the historical, cultural,
economic and political situation of any given society.”290
This Article has argued that virtue jurisprudence offers a potentially
rich and fruitful descriptive account of the nature, means, and ends of
bankruptcy law. It also has the potential to offer a unifying normative
theory of bankruptcy law—a theory that simultaneously resolves some
of the problems of existing theory and poses a new set of challenges.
This next step will be addressed in a follow-up article.

290. Farrelly, supra note 286, at 129; see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 216 (discussing
“contextualized decision making”).

